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Recentering Tribal Criminal Jurisdiction
Addie C. Rolnick
AbsTRACT
The boundaries of modern tribal criminal jurisdiction are defined by a handful of 
clear rules—such as a limit on sentence length and a categorical prohibition against 
prosecuting most non-Indians—and many grey areas in which neither Congress 
nor the Supreme Court has specifically addressed a particular question.  This Article 
discusses five of the grey areas: whether tribes retain concurrent jurisdiction to prosecute 
major crimes, whether tribes affected by Public Law 280 retain concurrent jurisdiction 
to prosecute a full range of crimes, whether tribes may prosecute Indians who are not 
citizens of any tribe, whether tribes may prosecute their own citizens for crimes that 
occur outside of Indian country, and how much authority and flexibility tribes have to 
address juvenile delinquency as they see fit.  
Many courts have employed an “outside in” approach to these questions, one which 
begins by assessing the scope of federal and state criminal jurisdiction and then 
attempts to discern the minimum degree of tribal criminal power necessary to fill the 
gap left by federal and state authority.  Because many tribal criminal justice systems 
have long devoted most of their resources to filling this gap (prosecuting only minor 
crimes committed by tribal citizens within Indian country), it may seem to a court 
that any further exercise of jurisdiction is unnecessary and new, leading to a limited 
vision of tribes’ retained criminal jurisdiction.  This approach prevents engagement with 
tribal jurisdiction and substantive criminal law on their own terms, leaving courts and 
legislators to rely on generalizations and assumptions rather than carefully considering 
the purpose and scope of, and limitations on, tribal criminal jurisdiction.  
In the past few decades, however, courts have followed the lead of tribes and legal 
scholars by employing an “inside out” approach, which centers tribes by asking only 
whether a particular power is an element of tribes’ sovereignty and whether it has 
been taken away.  When a court employs an inside out approach, neither the scope of 
federal and state jurisdiction nor the common practices of tribal criminal courts bear 
directly on the scope of modern tribal criminal power.  Tribal criminal jurisdiction is 
examined standing alone, which may lead to consideration of why criminal jurisdiction 
is necessary for sovereignty, the multiple functions such jurisdiction serves, and the 
various forms it may take.  As applied to the questions discussed here, the result is 
a much broader vision of tribes’ retained criminal power.  This Article explains why 
the inside out approach is the more appropriate one and how the analytical shift is 
attributable in large part to the work of Carole Goldberg.  By addressing five specific 
grey areas of tribal jurisdiction, this Article demonstrates how the use of an inside out 
methodology—a clear alternative to the implicit divestiture approach employed most 
famously in Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe—can have significant consequences for 
the future of tribal criminal jurisdiction. 
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INTRODUCTION 
American Indian tribes retain all sovereign powers that have not been 
explicitly divested by treaty or statute, or held by a court to have been lost as a 
result of tribes’ status as domestic dependent nations.1  Some of the most im-
portant questions in federal Indian law arise in the grey areas in which neither 
Congress nor the U.S. Supreme Court have considered whether tribes retain a 
particular power.  Tribes take steps to self-govern, and federal courts sometimes 
review their actions, leading to decisions that either clearly affirm or curtail that 
power.2  Analysis of these grey areas usually takes one of two forms.  An “outside 
in” analysis treats the scope of modern tribal power as a practical question 
about the minimum degree of authority tribes require in order to self-govern.  
Overlapping federal, state, and local authority matter when a court employs this 
approach: It is less likely to determine that a tribe needs a particular power if 
another government is serving the same function.  Historical practice also 
matters: When tribal governments do not exercise a particular sovereign 
power for a long period of time, a court may assume it is not required.  
An “inside out” analysis, on the other hand, asks whether a particular 
power is an aspect of tribes’ inherent sovereignty and, if so, whether it has been 
extinguished or limited by Congress or the Supreme Court.  It centers tribes, fo-
cusing on the range of purposes served by tribal jurisdiction, emphasizing the 
unique situation of modern tribal courts, and employing the legal rule that tribes 
retain any sovereign power not explicitly divested by Congress or clearly limited 
by the Supreme Court.  Instead of asking why tribes need a particular criminal 
power, what tribal courts usually do, or what minimum level of jurisdiction 
they need in order to fill gaps in law enforcement left where the federal or 
  
1. See United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323 (1978); COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL 
INDIAN LAW § 4.01[1][a] (Nell Jessup Newton et al. eds., 2012). 
2. For example, Congress has affirmed tribes’ power to prosecute Indians, but has prescribed rules 
governing the manner in which tribal courts must conduct criminal trials and the punishments they 
may impose.  25 U.S.C. §§ 1301–04.  The Supreme Court has affirmed tribes’ power to tax entities 
doing business in tribal territory, Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 137–38 (1982), 
and to freely determine citizenship rules, Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 55–56, 71–
72 (1978); Roff v. Burney, 168 U.S. 218, 223 (1897), but it has held that tribes no longer have the 
power to freely alienate land to anyone but the U.S. government, Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. 
543, 574 (1823), or to criminally prosecute non-Indian people who commit crimes in tribal 
territory, Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 195 (1978). 
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state governments have not been able to ensure public safety, this approach as-
sumes that tribes are like other sovereigns and asks whether there is a reason why 
they should not have a specific power.  The powers of other governments are 
significant only by analogy: If a particular power is an aspect of national or state 
sovereignty, it is likely an aspect of tribal sovereignty as well.  The historical 
practice of tribal courts does not necessarily determine the outer boundaries 
of their present-day jurisdiction.  
The latter approach is more faithful to the foundational principles of federal 
Indian law and will often result in a holding that tribes retain broad powers.  The 
former approach has historically been more common and usually results in a 
narrow interpretation of modern tribal power.  The difference between these 
two approaches, and the effect of methodological choice on substantive outcome, 
is especially apparent in the area of criminal jurisdiction.  An “outside in” analysis 
of unresolved questions about tribal criminal jurisdiction has led federal courts 
(and sometimes Indian law scholars and tribal courts) to adopt an artificially 
narrow vision of modern tribal criminal power.  An “inside out” approach, on the 
other hand, reveals few clear limits on tribal criminal jurisdiction, leaving tribes 
with much broader criminal power.  
Describing tribal criminal jurisdiction in 1976, Robert Clinton wrote that 
while it “is generally limited [in practice] to relatively minor crimes committed by 
Indians on the reservation, the potential reach of such jurisdiction may be sub-
stantially broader.”3  It makes sense that tribal criminal courts in 1976 would have 
exercised their power cautiously and judiciously.  A web of federal and state actors 
nearly suffocated tribal criminal justice systems for more than a century.4  Operat-
ing in the shadow of federal and state authority and reeling from the impact of 
two separate eras of federal policies that were especially destructive to tribal crim-
inal justice systems,5 tribal criminal courts through the 1970s likely limited their 
reach to ensure that scarce resources were directed at the most pressing problems.  
As Professor Clinton noted, however, changing assertions of tribal power raised 
the “more interesting legal question” of what tribal courts could do “should the 
tribes choose to enlarge their jurisdictional base”6 into grey areas such as the 
  
3. Robert N. Clinton, Criminal Jurisdiction Over Indian Lands: A Journey Through a Jurisdictional 
Maze, 18 ARIZ. L. REV. 503, 557–60 (1976). 
4. Addie C. Rolnick, Untangling the Web: Juvenile Justice in Indian Country, 19 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & 
PUB. POL’Y 49, 82–84 (forthcoming 2016) (describing federal and state dominance in the criminal 
area). 
5. See Rolnick, supra note 4, at 62–66 (explaining that tribal justice systems were undermined by the 
extension of federal power into local criminal matters during the Allotment and Assimilation Era, 
and by the extension of state power into Indian country during the Termination Era). 
6. Clinton, supra note 3, at 557. 
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prosecution of major crimes, the prosecution of non-Indians, and jurisdiction 
over crimes committed outside of Indian country.7   
As Professor Clinton predicted, tribes have prioritized building effective 
and responsive criminal justice institutions, an effort that has sometimes involved 
enlarging their jurisdictional base.  These courts operate in a landscape long dom-
inated by federal and state criminal justice machinery,8 however.  Judicial and 
scholarly analyses consequently have tended to focus on federal laws and federal 
actors (and to a lesser extent state laws and state actors).  Tribal jurisdiction has 
often been treated only as one part of the “maze,” or web, that governs criminal 
justice in Indian country.9  In this web, tribal courts function primarily as gap fill-
ers, their jurisdiction extending only so far as is necessary to cover the areas in 
which federal or state courts lack the jurisdiction, resources, or political will to ef-
fectively meet public safety needs.  Such an “outside in” approach to criminal 
justice questions begins with the top layers of the jurisdictional web and consid-
ers tribal jurisdiction last, if at all.  
While misguided, this approach is understandable: In order to determine 
how the justice system works on any given reservation, one must first discern the 
precise extent of federal, tribal, and state authority there, and any rules governing 
the interaction between them.  Federal criminal jurisdiction is an important 
piece of this puzzle on many reservations, so even the leading scholars of crimi-
nal justice in Indian country have tended to focus first and most extensively on 
the federal role.10  Several scholars have developed careful critiques of state and 
  
7. Id. 
8. INDIAN LAW & ORDER COMM’N, A ROADMAP FOR MAKING NATIVE AMERICA SAFER: 
REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT & CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES 1 (Nov. 2013), 
www.aisc.ucla.edu/iloc [https://perma.cc/2U3P-Q25Z]. 
9. Robert Clinton coined the term “jurisdictional maze,” Clinton, supra note 3, at 504, and scholars 
commonly describe Indian country criminal jurisdiction as a “maze.”  See, e.g., Richard W. Garnett, 
Once More Into the Maze: United States v. Lopez, Tribal Self-Determination, and Federal Conspiracy 
Jurisdiction in Indian Country, 72 N.D. L. REV. 433, 441–42 nn.57–60 (1996) (citing articles that 
use the maze analogy or similar terms); see also INDIAN LAW & ORDER COMM’N, supra note 8, at 
9 (describing the delivery of criminal justice services on reservations as a “jurisdictional maze”); 
AMNESTY INT’L, MAZE OF INJUSTICE: THE FAILURE TO PROTECT INDIGENOUS WOMEN 
FROM SEXUAL VIOLENCE IN THE USA (2007), http://www.amnestyusa.org/pdfs/mazeof 
injustice.pdf [https://perma.cc/JS52-DTCA].  While this is an accurate metaphor to describe the 
experience of trying to determine who has authority when a specific crime has been committed, I 
have used the term “web” because it better captures the top-down history of Indian country 
criminal justice, in which federal and state laws have been layered unevenly atop tribal criminal 
justice systems.  See Rolnick, supra note 4, at 83–84. 
10. Kevin K. Washburn, for example, has written extensively about how federal criminal jurisdiction 
operates in Indian country and the negative effects of that jurisdiction on tribal governments.  
While he has called for greater tribal control over criminal justice, he has not written as much about 
tribal criminal law or tribal courts.  See, e.g., Kevin K. Washburn, American Indians, Crime, and the 
Law, 104 MICH. L. REV. 709 (2006).  Even Robert Clinton, in his comprehensive analysis of 
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federal criminal jurisdiction in Indian country, which emphasize the importance 
of tribal jurisdiction and local control, but even these critiques tend to identify the 
reasons that tribal jurisdiction is better without engaging thorny questions about 
its scope.11   
The problem with this outside in approach is that it treats criminal justice in 
Indian country as primarily a matter of federal and state laws, with tribal criminal 
laws covering only less serious crimes that are not important enough to merit fed-
eral or state attention.  It asks only where tribal criminal courts are needed to fill 
gaps left by the other governments and what kinds of cases they most commonly 
hear as they struggle to fill those gaps.  The result is a severely curtailed picture of 
the criminal power of tribal governments.  When this approach is employed, a 
frequent answer to questions about the scope of modern criminal jurisdiction is 
that tribal courts need only enough power to prosecute tribal citizens for minor 
crimes that occur in Indian country.12  More fundamentally, the outside in ap-
proach prevents engagement with tribal jurisdiction and substantive criminal law 
on their own terms, leaving courts and legislators to rely on generalizations and 
assumptions rather than carefully considering the purpose and scope of, and limi-
tations on, tribal criminal jurisdiction.  
  
criminal jurisdiction in Indian country, began his discussion with federal jurisdiction.  Clinton, 
supra note 3, at 505–48; see also Robert N. Clinton, Development of Criminal Jurisdiction Over 
Indian Lands: The Historical Perspective, 17 ARIZ. L. REV. 951, 953–71 (1975) (beginning 
historical discussion with analysis of treaties and federal statutes).  Chapter 9 of Felix Cohen’s 
Handbook of Federal Indian Law, which covers criminal jurisdiction, includes multiple subsections 
on federal and state jurisdiction but only a single section on tribal jurisdiction.  See COHEN’S 
HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 1, § 9.04. 
11. See, e.g., Carole Goldberg & Duane Champagne, Is Public Law 280 Fit for the Twenty-First 
Century? Some Data at Last, 38 CONN. L. REV. 697, 707–29 (2006) (presenting data highlighting 
the shortcomings of state criminal jurisdiction in Indian country and proposing options for 
minimizing or repealing such jurisdiction); Kevin K. Washburn, American Indians, Crime, and the 
Law: Five Years of Scholarship on Criminal Justice in Indian Country, 40 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1003, 1014–
27 (2008); Kevin K. Washburn, Federal Criminal Law and Tribal Self-Determination, 84 N.C. L. 
REV. 779, 832–53 (2006) [hereinafter Washburn, Federal Criminal Law] (describing problems 
with the application of federal criminal law in Indian country and calling for greater tribal self-
determination in criminal justice, particularly minimizing or repealing federal criminal laws); Kevin 
K. Washburn, Tribal Self-Determination at the Crossroads, 38 CONN. L. REV. 777, 782–85 (2006) 
(explaining that lack of true tribal self-determination in the area of criminal justice “denies the tribe 
the ability to determine its own identity”). 
12. I use the term “minor crime” to refer to all crimes that are not specifically enumerated in the federal 
Major Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (2012).  I do not intend it as a commentary on the relative 
seriousness of any offense.  I avoid use of the terms “misdemeanor” and “felony” because those 
terms are circular in definition, with the length of resulting sentence determining whether 
something is a misdemeanor or a felony.  Because tribal court sentencing authority is restricted for 
all crimes, the length of sentence distinction is a useless point of reference. 
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Within two years of Professor Clinton’s article, the Supreme Court cur-
tailed the possibility that tribes could prosecute non-Indians.  This decision, 
Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe,13 stands as an example of the worst possi-
ble result of outside in reasoning.  Many tribes had renewed efforts to prosecute 
non-Indians who were committing crimes in Indian country.14  When the ques-
tion whether tribes retained their power to do so reached the Supreme Court, the 
Court focused mostly on its findings that tribes had rarely prosecuted non-
Indians during the previous century and that federal actors had never 
acknowledged the existence of such jurisdiction.15  It described in detail the 
laws extending federal jurisdiction to crimes committed by non-Indians on reser-
vations.16  Building on these observations, the Court held that “[b]y submitting to 
the overriding sovereignty of the United States, . . . tribes . . . necessarily give up 
their power to try non-Indian citizens of the United States except in a manner ac-
ceptable to Congress.”17  The Court’s holding that tribes were implicitly divested 
of their criminal power over non-Indians living in their territory was fueled by its 
historical assessment that federal and state governments had been handling non-
Indian crime to the exclusion of tribal governments for many decades, resulting in 
a “commonly shared presumption” against the continued existence of tribal crim-
inal jurisdiction to which the Court accorded “considerable weight.”18  Oliphant 
illustrates the stark consequences of an outside in approach that fails to center 
tribal jurisdiction and tribal criminal justice systems, focusing instead on federal 
and state power and relying only on assumptions about tribal power.  The result 
was a categorical rule, ironclad for over thirty years,19 that no tribe could prosecute 
  
13. 435 U.S. 191 (1978). 
14. See Sarah Krakoff, Mark the Plumber v. Tribal Empire, or Non-Indian Anxiety v. Tribal Sovereignty?: 
The Story of Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, in INDIAN LAW STORIES 261, 263, 284 (Carole 
Goldberg et al. eds., 2011).  According to the Court, thirty-three of the 127 tribes exercising 
criminal jurisdiction at the time claimed jurisdiction to prosecute non-Indians, and 
twelve more had enacted laws that would authorize them to assume such jurisdiction.  
Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 196. 
15. Non-acknowledgement was not surprising because early federal treaties and statutes create federal 
jurisdiction to hear cases arising out of non-Indians’ conduct affecting Indians on reservations, see 
supra note 28 (describing the General Crimes Act); they did not address how far tribal jurisdiction 
might extend. 
16. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 201–04. 
17. Id. at 210. 
18. Id. at 206. 
19. Congress in 2013 restored tribes’ inherent jurisdiction to prosecute a limited category of non-
Indian domestic violence offenders whose victims are Indian women.  Violence Against Women 
Reauthorization Act of 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-4, tit. IX, sec. 904, § 204(b), 127 Stat. 121–22 
(codified at 25 U.S.C. § 1304 (2013)); see infra note 25 (describing that law).  The Oliphant Court 
allowed for the possibility that a particular tribe may retain treaty-guaranteed rights to prosecute 
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a non-Indian person.  Until at least the 1990s, the other grey areas identified by 
Professor Clinton—extraterritorial jurisdiction and jurisdiction over major 
crimes—likewise seemed to hold little promise for a significant expansion of trib-
al jurisdiction beyond the realm of minor crimes committed by Indians on the 
reservation as courts continued the long-dominant outside in approach of treat-
ing tribal courts as gap fillers, underestimating the scope of tribal criminal juris-
diction, and paying insufficient attention to tribal courts.  
Much has changed in recent years.  Leading casebooks and treatises now 
embrace an inside out approach.  They address complex questions of tribal crimi-
nal jurisdiction on their own terms, rather than focusing almost exclusively on 
gaps in federal and state authority.  This shift is no doubt attributable to many 
factors: more law schools teaching federal Indian law, more scholarship offering 
critical analysis of the issue, better resources, the work of a generation of Indian 
law scholars and advocates, and the tenacity of tribes in pushing boundaries.  
Carole Goldberg’s work has been instrumental in guiding this shift.  From her 
close examination of Public Law 280,20 then a little-studied law that extended 
state jurisdiction into Indian country, to the centrality of tribal law in her teach-
ing21 to her work untangling the jurisdictional web as a member of the Indian 
Law and Order Commission,22 Professor Goldberg has consistently centered 
tribal governments in jurisdictional analyses.  Her casebook, Native Nations and 
the Federal System, radically shifted the analytical approach taught in many Indian 
law courses by presenting tribal perspectives first,23 organizing jurisdictional 
questions by sovereign, and leading with a discussion of tribal authority.24  This 
shift has had profound effects in the law governing tribal criminal jurisdiction.   
  
non-Indians, id. at 196, but I am not aware of any tribe that has successfully claimed such a right in 
federal court since Oliphant. 
20. Carole E. Goldberg, Public Law 280: The Limits of State Jurisdiction Over Reservation Indians, 22 
UCLA L. REV. 535, 535–94 (1975). 
21. Professor Goldberg is the lead author of Native Natives and the Federal System, a federal Indian law 
casebook that begins with and emphasizes tribal viewpoints on the nature of tribal power.  She 
created and taught an advanced seminar in Tribal Law and a Tribal Legal Development Clinic at 
UCLA School of Law. 
22. See INDIAN LAW & ORDER COMM’N, supra note 8, at 193. 
23. See CAROLE E. GOLDBERG ET AL., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW: NATIVE NATIONS AND THE 
FEDERAL SYSTEM 1–8, 225–26 (6th ed. 2010) (presenting treaty excerpts and statements from 
tribal leaders to illustrate the tribes’ understanding of the federal-tribal relationship and tribal 
governing authority).  In contrast, two other leading casebooks open with non-tribal perspectives—
an overview of federal Indian law, excerpts from academic articles, and a history of colonial 
perspectives and the doctrine of discovery.  See ROBERT A. ANDERSON ET AL., AMERICAN 
INDIAN LAW: CASES AND COMMENTARY 1–21 (2d ed. 2008); DAVID H. GETCHES ET AL., 
CASE AND MATERIALS ON FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 1–73 (5th ed. 2005). 
24. Rather than organizing the discussion of jurisdiction by issue, the authors present a complete 
discussion of tribal power, including the scope of tribal criminal jurisdiction, in chapter three before 
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Although Indian country criminal jurisdiction is marked by several clear 
rules,25 the grey areas loom larger today as tribes assert broader jurisdiction.  The 
Oliphant Court’s rule of implicit divestiture has been expanded in cases concern-
ing tribal civil jurisdiction, reaching toward a general presumption that tribes 
have lost all power to deal with outsiders.26  The grey areas of criminal jurisdic-
tion have received less attention.  There is a danger that courts will employ an 
outside in approach to all these unanswered questions, which will often lead to a 
rule that tribes have lost all aspects of criminal jurisdiction beyond the power to 
prosecute consenting members for minor crimes that occur on the reservation, 
and indeed some courts have so held.27 
More recently, though, courts have followed the lead of tribes, scholars, and 
advocates by employing an inside out approach to determine the boundaries of 
tribal criminal jurisdiction.  This approach offers an alternative to the Supreme 
Court’s jurisprudence on implicit divestiture in that it addresses each exercise of 
jurisdiction carefully without assuming that any particular aspect of jurisdiction 
has been lost simply because no federal court has addressed it.  The result in each 
case is a rule of retained tribal criminal power that reaches much more broadly 
than is often assumed.  While Congress and the Court have certainly restrict-
ed tribal criminal power much more than any other government’s criminal 
power,28 what remains is much more expansive than was envisioned half a 
century ago. 
  
reviewing state and federal authority, including criminal jurisdiction, in chapter four.  See Carole E. 
Goldberg et al., supra note 23, at 227–73, 337–55, 517–46.  Compare Getches et al., supra note 23, 
at 470–527 (presenting material on federal and state criminal jurisdiction before a discussion of the 
scope of and limits on tribal jurisdiction), with Anderson et al., supra note 23, at 310–32, 411–12, 
522–31, 593–625 (also presenting material on federal and state criminal jurisdiction before a 
discussion of the scope of and limits on tribal jurisdiction). 
25. See infra note 28 (discussing bright line limits on tribal criminal jurisdiction), text accompanying 
notes 30–31, 47, 115–118 (discussing the scope of federal criminal jurisdiction in Indian country) 
and notes 48, 75, 79, 119–120 (discussing the scope of state criminal jurisdiction in Indian 
country). 
26. See supra note 70 (citing civil implicit divestiture cases). 
27. See, e.g., Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 693 (1990) (“The retained sovereignty of the tribe is but a 
recognition of certain additional authority the tribes maintain over Indians who consent to be tribal 
members.”). 
28. The primary examples are 25 U.S.C. § 1302 (2012), stating that tribes may not sentence offenders 
to more than one year in jail or prison per offense, but authorizing sentences up to three years in 
some cases, and the bright line rule of Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978), 
that tribes may not prosecute non-Indians, as modified by 25 U.S.C. § 1304 (2013) (authorizing 
tribal prosecution of non-Indian domestic violence offenders in limited circumstances). 
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This Article focuses on five unresolved29 questions regarding the scope of 
tribal criminal jurisdiction to illustrate the effect of a shift from an outside in 
analysis that views tribes as gap fillers to an inside out analysis that centers 
tribes.  In addition to the two unanswered questions described by Professor Clin-
ton (extraterritorial jurisdiction and the power to prosecute major crimes), the 
Article discusses three additional questions about the outside boundaries of tribal 
power: whether tribes affected by Public Law 280 retain concurrent criminal ju-
risdiction, whether tribes may prosecute Indians who are not tribal citizens, and 
whether and to what extent tribes may address juvenile delinquency.  These are 
grey areas that implicate fundamental questions about the scope of criminal juris-
diction.  Whom can tribes prosecute and for which crimes?  What are the geo-
graphical limits of their jurisdiction?  How much freedom do tribes have to 
address crime as they see fit?  A review of how courts have approached (or might 
approach) each question illustrates the difference between the two approaches.  It 
also demonstrates how methodological choice affects results.  In each instance, an 
outside in approach leads to a rule of no tribal jurisdiction or a severely con-
strained understanding of the scope of modern tribal power.  An inside out ap-
proach, on the other hand, in which principles of retained sovereignty are 
faithfully applied to each question, results in an expanded view of tribal juris-
diction. 
Two of the questions discussed in this Article have received considerable 
attention in recent years: concurrent jurisdiction over major crimes and con-
current criminal jurisdiction for tribes affected by Public Law 280.  The Arti-
cle contrasts the way these questions were analyzed prior to the late twentieth 
century with how courts and scholars have approached them more recently.  The 
result in each case has been widespread agreement among scholars and lower fed-
eral courts (still unconfirmed by Congress or the Supreme Court) that tribes re-
tain concurrent jurisdiction in both circumstances.  The remaining questions 
have received less attention: the extent of criminal jurisdiction over non-citizen 
Indians, extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction, and juvenile delinquency jurisdic-
tion.  Here, the Article contrasts the assumptions that most often guide the 
limited analysis of each issue with the result of a considered analysis that centers 
tribes.  In each instance, centering tribes leads to a conclusion of broader retained 
jurisdiction. 
  
  
29. Unresolved in this context means that neither Congress nor the Supreme Court has directly 
addressed them. 
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I. CONCURRENT JURISDICTION OVER MAJOR CRIMES 
In 1885, Congress passed the Major Crimes Act,30 which created federal 
criminal jurisdiction over crimes committed by Indian people in Indian country.  
Prior to its passage, the federal government had exercised jurisdiction only over 
crimes between Indians and non-Indians,31 which implicated the relations be-
tween the United States and the tribes, while purely internal matters were 
considered the exclusive province of each tribe.  The Supreme Court con-
firmed as much in 1883 when it held that Kan-gi-shun-ca (Crow Dog), a Lakota 
Indian, could not be prosecuted in federal court for assassinating Sinte Gleska 
  
30. Major Crimes Act, ch. 394, § 9, 23 Stat. 385 (1885) (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1153, 3243).  The 
original Act provided that “[a]ny Indian who commits against the person or property of another 
Indian or other person” one of seven enumerated offenses “shall be subject to the same law and 
penalties as all other persons committing any of the above offenses, within the exclusive jurisdiction 
of the United States.”  In its current form, the Act lists thirteen separate crimes: murder, 
manslaughter, kidnapping, maiming, felony sexual abuse, incest, felony assault (including assault 
with intent to commit murder, assault with a dangerous weapon, and assault resulting in serious 
bodily injury), assault against a minor under the age of sixteen, felony child abuse or neglect, arson, 
burglary, robbery, and felony theft (theft in which the property taken is worth over $1000 and is 
taken directly from the person of another).  18 U.S.C. § 1153 (2012).  Some of the listed crimes 
actually encompass multiple different substantive offenses so that “it is now something of a fool’s 
errand to attempt to count the number of offenses” enumerated by the Act, but the modern version 
“encompasses three to four times as many offenses as in 1885.”  Washburn, Federal Criminal Law, 
supra note 11, at 826. 
31. Act of June 25, 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-772, 62 Stat. 757, ch. 645 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1152 
(2012)) (“[T]he general laws of the United States as to the punishment of offenses committed in 
any place within the sole and exclusive jurisdiction of the United States, except the District of 
Columbia, shall extend to the Indian country.”).  The first of such provisions appeared in the 
Indian Trade and Intercourse Acts, see, e.g., Act of May 19, 1796, ch. 30, § 15, 1 Stat. 469, 473 
(providing for federal court jurisdiction over specific crimes occurring on Indian lands and arising 
out of the relationship between Indians and settlers); Act of March 30, 1802, ch. 13, § 15, 2 Stat. 
139, 144 (same); Act of June 30, 1834, ch. 161, § 25, 4 Stat. 729, 733 (“[S]o much of the laws of 
the United States as provides for the punishment of crimes committed within any place within the 
sole and exclusive jurisdiction of the United States, shall be in force within the Indian country . . . 
[except that those laws] shall not extend to crimes committed by one Indian against the person or 
property of another Indian.”), and later appeared in the Revised Statutes of 1878, tit. 28, p. 374 
R.S. §§ 2145–46 (“[T]he general laws of the United States as to the punishment of crimes 
committed in any place within the sole and exclusive jurisdiction over the United States . . . shall 
extend to the Indian country . . . [except that] the preceding section shall not be construed 
to extend to [crimes committed by one Indian against the person or property of another Indian, 
nor to] any Indian committing an offense within the Indian country who has been punished by the 
local law of the tribe . . .”) (second alteration in original).  Later iterations of the Act have included 
an explicit statement that the law “shall not extend to offenses committed by one Indian against the 
person or property of another Indian,” so intra-Indian offenses did not fall under federal 
jurisdiction.  See 18 U.S.C. § 1152 (2012) (exception contained in current statute); see also Ex parte 
Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556, 571–72 (1883) (stating that the exception appeared in earlier laws).  See 
generally Clinton, supra note 3, at 522 n.88–89 (discussing history of federal jurisdiction over Indian 
lands and collecting statutes). 
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(Spotted Tail), a Lakota leader, on the Brulé Sioux Reservation.32  The Court, 
recognizing the longstanding exception by which crimes between Indians were 
reserved exclusively to tribal jurisdiction, refused to imply a repeal of that excep-
tion from ambiguous language in a treaty.33 
Federal agents, characterizing tribal justice systems as “savage” and unable 
to ensure a measure of civilization, advocated for a change in law that would bring 
internal crimes under the jurisdiction of federal courts.34  The result was the 
Major Crimes Act.35  Implicit in the Act’s passage was an acknowledgement 
that tribes possessed and exercised criminal jurisdiction over Indians who 
committed serious crimes.  The premise of the Act was that tribal jurisdiction 
was not effective at controlling crime because it was not sufficiently retributive or 
punitive.  For example, to restore peace after the murder of Sinte Gleska, the trib-
al council sent peacemakers to the families of both killer and victim, who agreed 
to an exchange of $600, eight horses, and one blanket.36  A draft version of the 
bill that became the Major Crimes Act would have provided that defendants 
covered by the Act be charged in federal courts “and not otherwise,” but the 
provision was removed from the final bill in order to preserve tribes’ inherent 
jurisdiction.37 
Yet, courts for some time interpreted the Act’s creation of federal juris-
diction and silence regarding tribal jurisdiction as an implicit extinguishment 
of tribal power to prosecute major crimes, or a confirmation that such power 
never existed.  Arriving at this conclusion requires relying on outside in reason-
ing.  Another government handles major crimes among reservation Indians, and 
tribes throughout most of the twentieth century did not often focus their 
  
32. Crow Dog, 109 U.S. at 572. 
33. Id. at 570–71. 
34. Id. at 134–38. 
35. Major Crimes Act, § 9, 23 Stat. 362 (1885) (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1153, 3243).  In United 
States v. Kagama, a case involving the murder of one Hoopa Indian by another, the Court upheld 
the law as a valid exercise of Congressional power over Indian affairs, despite the fact that it was one 
of the first instances of federal involvement in internal tribal affairs involving individual Indian 
people.  United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886).  Like the Lakota, the Hoopa and Yurok 
also had a functional system for resolving disputes and addressing crimes, but this system was not 
satisfactory to the Indian agents.  SIDNEY L. HARRING, The Distorted History That Gave Rise to the 
“So Called” Plenary Power Doctrine: The Story of United States v. Kagama, in INDIAN LAW 
STORIES 149, 161–69 (Carole Goldberg et al. eds., 2011). 
36. SIDNEY L. HARRING, CROW DOG’S CASE: AMERICAN INDIAN SOVEREIGNTY, TRIBAL 
LAW, AND UNITED STATES LAW IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 110 (1994).  According to 
Harring, “Brule law effectively and quickly redressed the killing and restored harmony, a point that 
even the U.S. Supreme Court later recognized.”  Id. 
37. See COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 1, § 9.04 (citing 16 Cong. 
Rec. 934–35); see also Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 203 n.14 (1978) (citing 
same). 
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formal criminal justice machinery on prosecuting these crimes.  According to 
the outside in approach, tribes have no need to exercise this power and have 
not historically done so; hence, it no longer exists.  In a case that arose half a 
century after the Act’s passage, a council of members of the Tule River tribe 
decided to execute a local doctor, who was accused of systematically poison-
ing his patients after more than twenty of them died in his care, and appoint-
ed four tribal members to carry out the death sentence.38  The doctor was shot 
and killed by the appointed group.39  Apparently assuming that the Act had de-
prived tribes of their inherent jurisdiction to determine guilt and impose pun-
ishment, a federal court convicted the executioners of manslaughter and 
sentenced them to five years each in prison.40  The opinion, barely three para-
graphs long, did not directly analyze the scope of tribal jurisdiction at all, not-
ing only that before the Act, “the government of the United States had . . . 
permitted the Indians preserving their tribal relations to regulate and govern 
their own internal and social relations” and describing the Act as “a radical 
change in that policy.”41 
Relying on that case, the Department of the Interior issued an opinion 
in 1934 stating that the Act had extinguished tribal jurisdiction.42  The De-
partment made this finding despite citing the general rule that Indians tribes 
retain all original sovereign powers that have not been clearly limited,43 and 
acknowledging that the Major Crimes Act did not expressly divest tribes of ju-
risdiction.44  More important in the Department’s view was its observation 
that the law “has been construed for many years as removing all jurisdiction 
over the enumerated crimes from the Indian tribal authorities.”45  The opinion 
described tribal court jurisdiction only in terms of jurisdictional gaps, noting 
that “[t]he lacunae in this brief criminal code of ten commandments are seri-
ous, and indicate the importance of tribal jurisdiction in the field of law and 
order,” and listing more than two dozens crimes over which neither federal nor 
state courts had jurisdiction.46 
  
38. United States v. Whaley, 37 F. 145 (C.C.S.D. Cal. 1888). 
39. Id. at 145. 
40. Id. at 146. 
41. Id. at 145. 
42. Powers of Indian Tribes, 55 Interior Dec. 14, 59–60 (1934).  
43. Id. at 57. 
44. See id. at 59. 
45. Id. at 59–60. 
46. Id. at 60. 
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Over the next half century, given the significant imposition of federal47 
and state48 criminal jurisdiction into Indian country and federal policies that 
undermined tribal justice systems, tribal courts focused their limited resources 
mainly on prosecuting offenses not being addressed by other governments.49  
When the question of retained tribal power to prosecute Indians for major 
crimes bubbled up to the Supreme Court several times in the same year, the idea 
of concurrent tribal jurisdiction was greeted with some skepticism.  In United 
States v. John, the Court declined to resolve the question whether tribes retained 
jurisdiction over major crimes, calling the issue “disputed.”50  In United States v. 
Wheeler, the Court similarly acknowledged but declined to resolve the question.51  
In Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, the Court, citing dicta from two more 
recent lower court decisions, suggested that Congress “may well have given the 
federal courts exclusive jurisdiction” over major crimes by Indians.52  The Court 
found it unnecessary to address the question directly,53 but its suggestion cast a 
shadow of doubt.  Decades later, the court still called it an “open question.”54 
Tribes are often described as having “misdemeanor jurisdiction.”55  On all 
reservations, either the federal or state government has jurisdiction over at least 
  
47. Together, sections 1152 and 1153 of Title 18 of the U.S. Code cover all crimes committed by 
Indians against non-Indians, all crimes committed by non-Indians against Indians, and major 
crimes between Indians.  See 18 U.S.C. §1152 (2012); see also 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (2012).  During 
the Allotment and Assimilation Era in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, tribal 
justice systems were undermined by the extension of federal power, including passage of the Major 
Crimes Act and the creation of Courts of Indian Offenses, federal administrative courts in which 
Indian people were prosecuted and punished, often for lifestyle-related offenses and engaging in 
outlawed traditional practices.  The Major Crimes Act was an attempt to bring American-style 
criminal justice to Indian country, and the Courts of Indian Offenses were instruments of 
assimilation “more in the nature of a school” to civilize Indian people.  See Rolnick, supra note 4, at 
62 nn.44–46. 
48. During the Termination Era, Congress again undermined tribal criminal justice systems to serve 
the larger purposes of assimilating Indian people and dismantling tribal governments, but this time 
it did so by extending state criminal law into Indian country.  By the end of the twentieth century, 
over half the tribes in the lower forty-eight states and all 229 Alaska Native villages were subject to 
state criminal jurisdiction as a result of Public Law 280.  DUANE CHAMPAGNE & CAROLE 
GOLDBERG, CAPTURED JUSTICE: NATIVE NATIONS AND PUBLIC LAW 280 14–15 (2012).  
Still more tribes are subject to state criminal jurisdiction as a result of land claim settlements entered 
into during the late twentieth century.  See Rolnick, supra note 4, at 86 n.163. 
49. Clinton, supra note 3, at 560. 
50. United States v. John, 437 U.S. 634, 651 n.21 (1978). 
51. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 325 n.22 (1978). 
52. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 203 (1978) (citing Felicia v. United States, 495 
F.2d 353, 354 (8th Cir. 1974); Sam v. United States, 385 F.2d 213, 214 (10th Cir. 1967)). 
53. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 203 n.14. 
54. Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 680 n.1 (1990). 
55. This is likely a consequence of both the federal law limiting tribes to one-year sentences, see supra 
note 28, and the widespread assumption for many years that federal jurisdiction under the Major 
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those crimes listed in the Major Crimes Act.56  As a practical matter, tribes may 
prefer to let another government take the lead for serious crimes, especially given 
the scarce resources, lack of personnel, and restrictions on sentence length faced 
by many tribal courts.  Because many tribes are the only sovereign with jurisdic-
tion over Indians who commit minor crimes, they may understandably choose to 
focus their resources on those crimes.  Yet, this combination of untested judicial 
assumptions and the exercise of only limited authority by tribal courts in practice 
nearly cost tribes their power to address serious crimes in their own courts.57 
More recently, however, courts have refused to rely on assumptions and 
have instead applied an inside out analysis to the question of tribal jurisdic-
tion over major crimes.  The Ninth Circuit directly addressed the question of 
concurrent jurisdiction over major crimes in 1995 in a case called Wetsit v. 
Stafne.58  Georgia Leigh Wetsit, a tribal citizen, was convicted of manslaughter in 
the Fort Peck tribal court after she stabbed her husband.59  The tribal court sen-
tenced her to one year in prison, ordered her to pay a $2500 fine, and ordered her 
to participate in mental health and domestic violence programs.60  She argued 
  
Crimes Act was exclusive.  E.g., TRIBAL COURT HANDBOOK FOR THE 26 FEDERALLY 
RECOGNIZED TRIBES IN WASHINGTON STATE (Ralph W. Johnson & Rachael Paschal eds., 
1992), http://www.msaj.com/papers/handbook.htm [https://perma.cc/GL4X-R7P9] (referring to 
the restoration of “tribal criminal misdemeanor jurisdiction over all Indians”); Sheila Stogsdill, 
Oklahoma Crime: Jurisdiction in Indian Country Involves Federal, Tribal, State Governments, 
OKLAHOMAN (Apr. 22, 2012), http://newsok.com/article/3668428 [https://perma.cc/J9LB-
4LEE] (“Tribal law enforcement departments have jurisdiction over victimless and misdemeanor 
crimes committed on tribal land.”).  Even Congress seemed concerned primarily with tribal 
prosecution of minor crimes when it passed a law restoring tribal criminal jurisdiction over 
nonmember Indians.  See, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 101-938, at 132 (1990) (Conf. Rep.) (referring to 
tribal jurisdiction as “criminal misdemeanor jurisdiction”).  See generally supra Part III. 
56. The extent of concurrent federal and state jurisdiction is described at notes 30–31, 47–48, 75, 79, 
115–120.  Generally speaking, in non-Public Law 280 states, federal courts have concurrent 
jurisdiction over major crimes committed by Indians in Indian country.  If Public Law 280 applies, 
state courts have concurrent jurisdiction over all crimes committed by Indians in Indian country.  
H.R. 1063, 83rd Cong. (1953). 
57. The outside in analysis of jurisdiction is characterized by a “use it or lose it” rule that echoes how the 
defense of laches has been employed in the civil realm to divest tribes of important rights.  See, e.g., 
Nebraska v. Parker, 136 S. Ct. 1072, 1082 (2016) (holding that the boundaries of the Omaha 
Reservation had not been diminished, but raising the question whether “equitable considerations of 
laches and acquiescence may curtail the Tribe’s power to tax [area retailers] in light of the Tribe’s 
century-long absence from the disputed lands”); City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation, 544 U.S. 
197, 221 (2005) (equitable considerations of laches, acquiescence, and impossibility prevent tribe 
from asserting its immunity from state taxation on tribally owned land that was within the 
boundaries of the tribe’s historic reservation but had been illegally sold and was therefore occupied 
by non-Indians). 
58. 44 F.3d 823, 825 (9th Cir. 1995). 
59. Id. at 824. 
60. Id.  A jury had acquitted her on charges of voluntary manslaughter in federal district court, id., but 
prosecution for the same crime by tribal and federal authorities does not create a double jeopardy 
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that the tribe was without jurisdiction to prosecute her for manslaughter because 
manslaughter is an offense exclusively reserved to federal jurisdiction by the 
Major Crimes Act.61  In support of her argument, Westsit cited Whaley and 
several other cases in which lower federal courts had described the Major 
Crimes Act as limiting tribal power without any further analysis.62  In light of 
the assumptions that long governed this area, her argument may have 
seemed like a safe one. 
The court disagreed.  It characterized a tribe’s power to prosecute its mem-
bers for crimes committed in its territory as an aspect of the tribe’s inherent sover-
eignty.63  It relied primarily on United States v. Wheeler, in which the Supreme 
Court affirmed that tribes had not given up their power to prosecute their mem-
bers for tribal offenses “by virtue of [their] dependent status.’”64  In the Ninth 
Circuit’s view, the question whether tribes retained their inherent power to pros-
ecute members for any crime had been answered by Wheeler.  Although the 
prosecution in Wheeler was for a crime not included in the Major Crimes 
Act,65 the court noted that it cited with approval Talton v. Mayes (a century-
old case), which held that a tribe could criminally punish a tribe member for 
murder and did so acting “as an independent sovereign.”66  Together, Talton 
  
problem as long as both courts are exercising inherent jurisdiction.  See United States v. Wheeler, 
435 U.S. 313, 329–30 (1978). 
61. Wetsit, 44 F.3d at 824.  
62.  See Brief of Appellant Georgia Leigh Wetsit at *14–18, Westsit v. Stafne, 44 F.3d 823 (9th Cir. 
1995) (citing Felicia v. United States, 495 F.2d 353, 354 (8th Cir. 1974); Sam v. United States, 385 
F.2d 213, 214 (10th Cir. 1967); Iron Crow v. Ogalala Sioux Tribe, 129 F. Supp. 15, 18 (D.S.D. 
1955), aff'd, 231 F.2d 89 (8th Cir. 1956); Glover v. United States, 219 F. Supp. 19, 20 (D. Mont. 
1963); United States v. La Plant, 156 F. Supp. 660, 662 (D. Mont. 1957)). 
63. Wetsit, 44 F.3d at 825.  The Tribe was represented by attorney Reid Chambers, one of 
Carole Goldberg’s early Indian law colleagues at UCLA, and James Kawahara, one of 
Professor Goldberg’s former students.  In the Tribe’s brief, they reminded the court that the Act 
did not expressly retract tribal authority to punish major crimes and that “this, standing alone, 
compels rejection of Appellant’s contention[.]”  Brief of Appellant Georgia Leigh Wetsit, supra 
note 62, at 17.  They also argued that Wheeler, in which a tribal court and a federal court had both 
prosecuted the defendant for crimes arising from the same set of events, and Talton v. Mayes, which 
affirmed a tribal murder conviction just a few years after passage of the Act, resolved the question.  
Id. at 22–26; see also Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376 (1896). 
64. 435 U.S. 313, 326 (1978). 
65. The tribe prosecuted Wheeler for contributing to the delinquency of a minor, whereas the federal 
government prosecuted him for “carnal knowledge of [a] female under sixteen years of age [who is 
not married to the defendant],” which is listed in the Major Crimes Act.  Id. at 315 n.3.  The Wetsit 
court also relied on Duro v. Reina, another case in which the Court had affirmed inherent tribal 
power to prosecute tribal members, but one that similarly involved tribal prosecution for an offense 
not enumerated in the Major Crimes Act.  Duro had been charged with murder in federal court, 
but the indictment was dismissed.  He was later charged with illegally firing a weapon in tribal 
court.  Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 680 (1990). 
66. Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 329 (citing Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376 (1896)). 
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and Wheeler left little doubt for the Ninth Circuit that tribes had always possessed 
the inherent power to prosecute and punish their members for violation of the 
tribe’s criminal laws, and that even the Supreme Court agreed that the power per-
sisted. 
The centrality of Wheeler in the court’s reasoning is also significant for ana-
lytical reasons.  Wheeler is often cited today for the rule that “Indian tribes still 
possess those aspects of sovereignty not withdrawn by treaty or statute, or by im-
plication as a necessary result of their dependent status.”67  Issued the same year as 
Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe,68 the Court’s most significant decision about 
loss of inherent tribal sovereignty, Wheeler offered a counterweight to the Oli-
phant Court’s unprecedented69 holding that tribes had lost some inherent powers 
without any explicit action by Congress to extinguish them.  The Wheeler rule 
confirmed that, unless a particular power could be characterized as one that had 
been implicitly divested,70 retention of all inherent sovereign powers remains the 
  
67. Id. at 323. 
68. 435 U.S. 191 (1978). 
69. Before Oliphant, the Court had only twice held that tribes had lost aspects of their sovereignty 
through implicit divestiture, rather than through express language in a treaty or statute.  The Court 
had held that tribes lost the “power to dispose of the soil at their own will, to whomsoever they 
pleased.”  Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. 543, 574 (1823).  In addition, the Court held that tribes 
lost the power of independent external relations with foreign nations.  Cherokee Nation v. 
Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17–18 (1831).  Besides those powers, the exercise of which could 
potentially threaten the existence of the United States as a nation, tribes were thought to possess 
any power that had not been affirmatively taken away.  See Philip P. Frickey, A Common Law for 
Our Age of Colonialism: The Judicial Divestiture of Indian Tribal Authority Over Nonmembers, 109 
YALE L.J. 1, 13–14, 36 (1999) (describing the limited category of implicit divestiture prior to 
Oliphant and noting that the Court “reopened a category of diminished tribal authority that had 
been thought closed forever since the Marshall Court”).  In Oliphant, the Court reversed this 
approach, asking instead whether Congress had ever affirmed the existence of tribal criminal 
jurisdiction over non-Indians and whether tribes had historically exercised such jurisdiction.  
Finding little evidence of historical exercise or congressional or executive confirmation of the 
power, the Court held that it had been lost.  435 U.S. at 197–209 (“While Congress never expressly 
forbade Indian tribes to impose criminal penalties on non-Indians, we now make express our 
implicit conclusion of nearly a century ago that Congress consistently believed this to be the 
necessary result of its repeated legislative actions.”). 
70. Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 326 (“The areas in which such implicit divestiture of sovereignty has been held 
to have occurred are those involving the relations between an Indian tribe and nonmembers of the 
tribe” or those that otherwise involve a tribe’s “external relations.”).  After Wheeler, implicit 
divestiture has been invoked primarily in cases involving tribal civil jurisdiction over outsiders.  See, 
e.g., Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land & Cattle Co., 554 U.S. 316, 328 (2008) 
(holding that tribal court lacked jurisdiction over discrimination claim involving the sale of nontrust 
land from one nonmember to another); Nevada v. Hicks, 553 U.S. 353, 359 (2001) (holding tribal 
court did not have jurisdiction to hear claims against state police officers for activities that occurred 
on tribal land while carrying out a search warrant to investigate an off-reservation crime); Atkinson 
Trading Co. v. Shirley, 532 U.S. 645, 647 (2001) (holding that tribe could not tax non-Indian 
business in non-Indian fee land within reservation); Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 454–
55 (1997) (holding that tribal courts may not hear cases arising out of a car accident involving two 
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default answer.  This rule has special force in an area that was historically the 
province of tribal governments, such as internal criminal prosecutions. 
Instead of assuming away tribal jurisdiction over major crimes, the Wetsit 
court understood that, as sovereigns, tribes enjoyed broad power to pass criminal 
laws and punish people who violated them.  Absent a clear statement by Con-
gress or the Supreme Court that tribes lost this power with regard to major 
crimes, that authority persists in modern times, regardless of how often tribes 
elect to exercise it.  Significantly, the court’s opinion lacked any sustained discus-
sion of federal and state criminal jurisdiction.  Without this familiar invocation of 
the “jurisdictional maze,”71 with its emphasis on practical coverage and filling 
gaps, it is clear that the only authorities curtailing tribes’ inherent criminal power 
were Oliphant and the Indian Civil Rights Act,72 neither of which were implicat-
ed by the case.  Employing an inside out approach, the court understood that 
congressional silence on tribal jurisdiction over major crimes, like tribal inactivity, 
does not equate to loss of jurisdiction.  Authorities today largely agree with the 
Ninth Circuit’s view.73 
II. CONCURRENT JURISDICTION UNDER PUBLIC LAW 280 
Tribes subject to state jurisdiction under Public Law 280 faced a similar 
question about the persistence of concurrent tribal jurisdiction.  Passed in 1953 at 
the height of what is known as the Termination Era,74 Public Law 280 delegated 
  
nonmembers of the tribe that occurred on a highway right-of-way crossing tribal trust land); 
Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 408, 441–45 
(1989) (holding that tribe cannot apply zoning regulations to nonmembers who live in “open” 
portion, where tribal and member land was broken up by many tracts owned in fee by 
nonmembers); Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 566–67 (1981) (holding that tribe cannot 
regulate hunting and fishing by nonmembers on nonmember-owned fee land). 
71. See supra note 9 (describing “maze” metaphor). 
72. The Indian Civil Rights Act limits the penalties that tribes may impose in criminal proceedings 
and requires tribal courts to ensure certain due process protections in carrying out criminal trials.  25 
U.S.C. § 1302.  See infra notes 263–273 and accompanying text (describing the Act’s limits on 
tribal court jurisdiction). 
73. Accord Wetsit v. Stafne, 44 F.3d 823, 825–26 (1995) (noting that its holding reflected the 
“conclusion already reached by distinguished authorities on the subject”); see, e.g., COHEN’S 
HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 1, § 9.04 (noting earlier judicial and 
regulatory opinions to the contrary but concluding that the Wetsit court’s conclusion is “the correct 
one”); see Anderson et al., supra note 23, at 326; Getches et al., supra note 23, at 377–81; Goldberg 
et al., supra note 23, at 528–37; see also United States v. Gallagher, 624 F.3d 934, 942 (9th Cir. 
2010); United States v. Arcoren, No. CR. 89-30049, 1999 WL 638244, at *6 (D.S.D. 1999).  But 
see United States v. Red Bird, 287 F.3d 709, 714 n.6 (8th Cir. 2002) (declining to decide the issue 
and noting that the Supreme Court has not yet decided it). 
74. From approximately 1940 through 1962, federal Indian policy was guided by the goal of 
assimilating Indians and ending the federal-tribal relationship.  See H.R. Con. Res. 108, 83rd 
1656 63 UCLA L. REV. 1638 (2016) 
 
criminal jurisdiction over Indian country from the federal government to specific 
states.75  The law provided that neither the Indian Country Crimes Act76 nor the 
Major Crimes Act77 would apply in the areas of Indian country affected by it,78 so 
it was in a sense a delegation of authority from the federal government to the 
states.  However, the scope of jurisdiction actually granted by Public Law 280 was 
broader than that previously exercised by the federal government.  Most notably, 
because the Act extended all state criminal laws to offenses committed by Indians 
in Indian country, it gave states jurisdiction over all crimes between Indians, not 
just enumerated major crimes.79  Whereas tribal criminal jurisdiction continued 
to be acknowledged as necessary to fill the gap in federal jurisdiction left by sec-
tions 1152 and 1153, there was no gap left in Public Law 280 states.  
The outside in approach to the question whether tribes retained concurrent 
jurisdiction is evident not in specific cases but in the overall culture of lack of sup-
port and respect for tribal justice systems in Public Law 280 states.  Although the 
Act itself was silent regarding tribal jurisdiction, Professor Goldberg has thor-
oughly documented how the law undermined tribal criminal justice systems.80  In 
  
Cong., 67 Stat. B132 (1953) (setting forth Congressional policy of assimilation).  In addition to 
extending state criminal jurisdiction over some Indian lands, see supra note 48, Congress unilaterally 
terminated the federal-tribal relationship with over one hundred tribes and established a relocation 
program to encourage Indian people to move from reservations to cities.  See Addie C. Rolnick, The 
Promise of Mancari: Indian Political Rights as Racial Remedy, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 958, 984–85 (2011) 
(describing specific laws and policies of the Termination Era). 
75. Act of Aug. 15, 1953, ch. 505, 67 Stat. 588 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §1162 (2012), 25 
U.S.C. §§ 1321–26 (2012), and 28 U.S.C. § 1360); see also Act of Aug. 8, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-
615, § 2, 72 Stat. 545 (transferring jurisdiction to Alaska).  It specifically provides that six states 
(Alaska, California, Minnesota, Nebraska, Oregon, and Wisconsin) “shall have jurisdiction over 
offenses committed by or against Indians in the areas of Indian country listed opposite the name of 
the State or Territory to the same extent that such State or Territory has jurisdiction over offenses 
committed elsewhere within the State or Territory, and the criminal laws of such State or Territory 
shall have the same force and effect within such Indian country as they have elsewhere within the 
State or Territory.”  Act of Aug. 15, 1953, ch. 505, 67 Stat. 588.  Specific reservations were 
exempted from the Act and continued to be subject to federal criminal jurisdiction.  The Act also 
authorizes additional states to accept jurisdiction over Indian country.  25 U.S.C. § 1321–26.  
Although the original Act did not require tribal consent to future assertions of state jurisdiction, 
Act of Aug. 15, 1953, ch. 505, § 7, 72 Stat. 590, it was amended in 1968 to require tribal consent.  
Pub. L. 90-284, tit. IV § 401, 82 Stat. 78 (1968).  
76. 18 U.S.C. § 1152 (2012); see supra note 31. 
77. 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (2012); see supra note 30. 
78. 18 U.S.C. § 1162 (2012). 
79. CAROLE GOLDBERG-AMBROSE, PLANTING TAIL FEATHERS: TRIBAL SURVIVAL AND 
PUBLIC LAW 280, at 165 (1997). 
80. Id. at 11–12, 200–01 (describing how Interior’s varying interpretations of Public Law 280’s effect 
on tribal criminal jurisdiction, along with other Department policies, led to “confusion about the 
jurisdictional authority” of California tribal courts and difficulty accessing federal funding); 
CHAMPAGNE & GOLDBERG, supra note 48, at 20 (“In practice, however, the frequent denial of 
federal funding support for tribal law enforcement and criminal justice in Public Law 280 states has 
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the first decades after the law’s passage, states frequently operated as if tribal 
criminal courts and law enforcement agencies did not exist or did not matter.81  
Federal agencies likewise relied on the existence of state authority to justify 
withholding base funding for law enforcement and criminal justice from tribes 
subject to Public Law 280.82 According to this view, dominant for over two 
decades, tribal criminal jurisdiction is not needed because states have assumed 
all law enforcement and criminal prosecution authority for Indian country 
within their borders.83  If an outside in approach is employed, the statute itself 
can be read to signal nonexistence of tribal jurisdiction; it addressed only federal 
and state criminal jurisdiction, treating these two as mutually exclusive, but eras-
ing tribal criminal justice systems in the process.  Indeed, the Department of 
the Interior on several occasions took the position that the Act extinguished 
tribal criminal jurisdiction.84  The Associate Solicitor for Indian Affairs sug-
gested in 1971 that tribes retained jurisdiction to regulate (including by issuing li-
censes and imposing criminal penalties for) tribal hunting and fishing rights, 
which were expressly preserved by the statute.  By emphasizing the treaty-
protected nature of those rights, the Associate Solicitor implied that any jurisdic-
tion not explicitly preserved by a treaty might be foreclosed by the application of 
state law and state jurisdiction.85   
  
retarded the development of those agencies as compared with similar institutions [in other 
states].”). 
81. See GOLDBERG-AMBROSE, supra note 79, at 192, 195 (describing arguments made by California 
and Alaska that tribal courts were divested of authority by Public Law 280); see also Cabazon Band 
of Mission Indians v. Smith, 34 F. Supp. 2d 1201, 1206 (C.D. Cal. 1998) (describing state 
attempts to regulate tribal police officers’ use of sirens and lights on pockets of non-tribal land 
connecting portions of the reservation). 
82. CHAMPAGNE & GOLDBERG, supra note 48, at 118–22 (finding disparity between Public Law 
280 tribes and non-Public Law 280 tribes in funding received from the BIA for tribal justice 
systems); GOLDBERG-AMBROSE, supra note 79, at 192 (describing “general belief and policy” of 
the BIA that California tribes had no jurisdictional authority); Vanessa J. Jiménez & Soo C. Song, 
Concurrent Tribal and State Jurisdiction Under Public Law 280, 47 AM. U. L. REV. 1627, 1636 
(1998) (describing how tribes affected by Public Law 280 face “uneven administration of justice in 
terms of respect for their authority, their eligibility for state and federal funding, the effectiveness of 
their justice systems, and the level of participation and cooperation with state and federal systems”). 
83. See B. J. Jones, Welcoming Tribal Courts Into the Judicial Fraternity: Emerging Issues in Tribal-State 
and Tribal-Federal Court Relations, 24 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 457, 472 (1998) (describing how 
tribes subject to Public Law 280 were frequently assumed to lack criminal jurisdiction). 
84. Opinions of the Solicitor, Memorandum from the Solicitor to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, 
M-36241 (Sept. 22, 1954), http://thorpe.ou.edu/sol_opinions/p1626-1650.html#m-36241; see 
also Opinion of the Solicitor, Criminal Jurisdiction P.L. 280 (Nov. 14, 1978), reprinted in 6 
INDIAN L. REP. H1, H1–H2 (1979) (citing a 1954 letter from Assistant Secretary Lewis to 
Minneapolis Area Director and a 1961 Memorandum of the Solicitor). 
85. 78 INTERIOR DEC. 101, 102 (1971). 
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Carole Goldberg published her pathbreaking article on Public Law 280 in 
1975,86 and the Supreme Court subsequently analyzed the statute in two major 
decisions.  These decisions, Bryan v. Itasca County,87 and California v. Cabazon 
Band of Mission Indians,88 considered whether Public Law 280 granted states civil 
regulatory jurisdiction along with criminal jurisdiction.  The Court in each case 
employed an inside out analysis, in which the law’s infringement on tribal sover-
eignty was read to be only as broad as Congress had clearly authorized, an ap-
proach that was shaped in part by Professor Goldberg’s 1975 article.89  In the 
wake of these developments, a 1978 Solicitor’s Opinion affirmed the continued 
criminal jurisdiction of tribes affected by Public Law 280.90  The opinion 
acknowledged the Department’s prior statements suggesting that the law extin-
guished tribal criminal jurisdiction,91 but admitted that “the position seems never 
to have been the subject of any considered legal analysis and now appears to be in 
conflict with principles enunciated in recent decisions of the Supreme Court.”92  
Citing Wheeler, Oliphant, and Bryan, the Solicitor concluded that “such a funda-
mental sovereign power as law enforcement authority may not be withdrawn by 
statutory implication when such an implication is not necessary to the objective of 
the statute.”93 
It was not until the 1990s that courts squarely addressed the law’s effect on 
tribal criminal jurisdiction and, as in the case of major crime jurisdiction, federal 
courts of this era followed an inside out approach instead of assuming that tribal 
jurisdiction had been lost.  One of the first cases to recognize the continuing ex-
istence of criminal jurisdiction for tribes affected by Public Law 280 was Walker 
v. Rushing, decided by the Eighth Circuit in 1990.94  Ann Walker, a citizen of 
the Omaha Tribe of Nebraska, challenged the tribe’s jurisdiction to prosecute 
her for homicide after she struck and killed two other tribal members while 
  
86. Carole E. Goldberg, Public Law 280: The Limits of State Jurisdiction Over Reservation Indians, 22 
UCLA L. REV. 535, 540–44 (1975) (exploring P.L. 280’s history and issues concerning its 
implementation, including the question of state regulatory authority).  Although the article did not 
squarely address the question of retained tribal criminal jurisdiction, id. at 545 n.53 (citing 1971 
Solicitor’s Opinion and noting that “whether tribal courts may survive PL-280 as a general matter, 
so long as they apply state law or rules consistent with state law, has never been tested”), Professor 
Goldberg followed an inside out approach when analyzing of other aspects of the law. 
87. 426 U.S. 373 (1976). 
88. 480 U.S. 202, 208 (1987). 
89. See Bryan, 426 U.S. at 388 nn.13–14 (citing article). 
90. Sol. Op., 6 INDIAN L. REP. at H-3. 
91. Id. at H-1 (citing 1954 and 1961 opinions suggesting that the law extinguished tribal jurisdiction, 
but also citing 1976 and 1978 opinions affirming tribal criminal jurisdiction). 
92. Id. at H-2. 
93. Id. at H-3. 
94. 898 F.2d 672 (8th Cir. 1990). 
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driving.  Nebraska had been granted criminal jurisdiction over the Omaha reser-
vation as one of the six mandatory states included in Public Law 280’s initial 
grant of jurisdiction to states.95  In 1969, the Nebraska legislature partially retro-
ceded its criminal jurisdiction over the Omaha reservation back to the federal 
government, but the state retained jurisdiction over “offenses involving the op-
eration of motor vehicles on public roads or highways.”96 
While the lower court had ruled against tribal jurisdiction on the theory that 
the Major Crimes Act (which applied post-retrocession) divested the tribal court 
of jurisdiction to prosecute homicides,97 the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals 
correctly recognized that Walker’s offense fell under state, rather than federal, ju-
risdiction because Nebraska had not retroceded jurisdiction over motor vehicle 
offenses.98  Turning to the question whether Public Law 280 divested the tribe of 
jurisdiction, the court employed the basic rule that “limitations on an Indian 
tribe’s power to punish its own members must be clearly set forth by Congress.”99  
Finding “[n]othing in the wording of Public Law 280 or its legislative history 
[that] precludes concurrent tribal authority,” the court held that the tribe retained 
concurrent jurisdiction.100 
The Ninth Circuit reached the same conclusion a year later in a case involv-
ing the status of lands conveyed in fee to Alaska Native entities by the Alaska Na-
tive Claims Settlement Act (ANCSA).  After concluding that ANCSA lands 
qualified as Indian country and that Alaska Native villages had the sovereign 
power to adjudicate child custody disputes arising on their lands,101 the court 
considered Alaska’s argument that Public Law 280 had divested the tribes 
of whatever jurisdiction they may have possessed.  Reviewing the text and 
legislative history of the law, the court concluded that it was “not a divesti-
ture statute.”102  Although it was enacted during the Termination Era, the court 
  
95. Id. at 673. 
96. Id. at 673–74. 
97. Id. at 672–73. 
98. Id. at 674. 
99. Id. at 675. 
100.  Id. 
101. Native Village of Venetie I.R.A. Council v. Alaska, 944 F.2d 548 (9th Cir. 1991).  The Supreme 
Court reversed this aspect of the court’s holding in Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie Tribal 
Government, 522 U.S. 520 (1998).  Because the Court determined that ANCSA lands did not 
qualify as Indian country at all, the question whether Public Law 280 divested Alaska Native 
entities of jurisdiction over Indian country was moot for all but the one remaining reservation in 
Alaska.  See Booth v. State, 903 P.2d 1079, 1084 (Alaska Ct. App. 1995) (holding that the state 
and the Metlakatla Indian Community have concurrent jurisdiction over crimes committed on the 
Annette Islands Reserve, the only reservation left after ANCSA, under an amendment to Public 
Law 280 specifically reaffirming the Metlakatla Community’s continued jurisdiction). 
102. Venetie, 944 F.2d at 560. 
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noted that it “plainly was not intended to effect total assimilation of Indian 
tribes.”103  The court noted that certain tribes were exempted from the law’s cov-
erage where Congress deemed their tribal justice systems satisfactory enough to 
alleviate concerns about the “lack of adequate criminal law enforcement on some 
reservations.”104  Citing Bryan and Cabazon, as well as Professor Goldberg’s 
article analyzing the statute, the court concluded that “Public Law 280 was 
designed not to supplant tribal institutions, but to supplement them.”105 
Today, there is widespread agreement among scholars that tribes retain 
concurrent jurisdiction even if subject to Public Law 280.106  In addition to the 
three federal courts that initially affirmed the existence of concurrent tribal juris-
diction,107 a number of courts since have cited this rule as if it were settled law.108 
III. JURISDICTION OVER NON-CITIZENS WITHIN TRIBAL TERRITORY 
The previous Parts described unresolved questions about which crimes 
tribes may prosecute, particularly when another sovereign has jurisdiction over 
those same crimes.  Another grey area concerns the question of whom tribes may 
prosecute.  The Oliphant Court’s holding that tribes lost criminal jurisdiction over 
non-Indians109 has never been squarely rejected by Congress and so continues to 
  
103. Id. (citing California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 208 (1987)). 
104. Id. 
105. Id. at 560. 
106. COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 1, § 6.04[3][c] (describing the 
“nearly unanimous view” but noting that this “consensus . . . has developed relatively recently”); 
GOLDBERG-AMBROSE, supra note 79, at 158–63; Jiménez & Song, supra note 82, at 1667–91 
(1998) (demonstrating that Public Law 280 did not divest tribes of criminal jurisdiction). 
107. Native Village of Venetie I.R.A. Council, 944 F.2d at 560; Walker v. Rushing, 898 F.2d 672, 675 
(8th Cir. 1990); Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. South Dakota, 709 F. Supp. 1502, 1512 n.17, 1515–16 
(D.S.D. 1989), vacated on other grounds, 900 F.2d 1164 (8th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 114 L.Ed. 2d 
98 (1991) (citing the 1982 version of Felix Cohen’s Handbook of Federal Indian Law for the 
conclusion that state jurisdiction granted by Public Law 280 was concurrent with tribal 
jurisdiction); see also Booth v. State, 903 P.2d 1079, 1084 (Alaska Ct. App. 1995) (holding that the 
state and the Metlakatla Indian Community have concurrent jurisdiction over crimes committed 
on the Annette Islands Reserve). 
108. K2 America Corp. v. Roland Oil & Gas, LLC, 653 F.3d 1024, 1028 n.5 (9th Cir. 2011); TTEA v. 
Yselta del Sur Pueblo, 181 F.3d 676, 685 (5th Cir. 1999); Conf. Tribes of the Colville Reservation 
v. Superior Court of Okanogan Cty., 945 F.2d 1138, 1140 n.4 (9th Cir. 1991); State v. Schmuck, 
850 P.2d 1332, 1343 (Wash. 1993) (citing to Walker and to opinions of Wisconsin and Nebraska 
state attorneys general that Public Law 280 did not divest tribes criminal jurisdiction); 
Mashantucket Pequot Tribe v. Sebastian, 4 Mash. Rep. 112, 116 (Mashantucket Pequot Tribal 
Court 2003) (relying on Walker to hold that Mashantucket Pequot Indian Claims Settlement Act, 
which was modeled after Public Law 280, did not divest the tribe of criminal jurisdiction when it 
granted such jurisdiction to the state). 
109. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 453 U.S. 191, 211 (1978). 
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function as a clear rule limiting tribal power.110  Twelve years later, in a case called 
Duro v. Reina, the Court extended its Oliphant logic to hold that tribes had been 
divested of criminal jurisdiction over all non-citizens, whether Indian or non-
Indian.111  Congress responded quickly this time, however, passing legislation to 
confirm that tribes retain criminal jurisdiction over “all Indians.”112  That law, 
known as the “Duro fix,” clearly established that tribes can prosecute non-
member Indians,113 but what makes someone an Indian for purposes of sub-
jecting them to tribal jurisdiction remains a grey area.  Depending on the 
methodology it employs, a court could interpret this category to include only 
those people over whom the federal government lacks jurisdiction and whose 
prosecution would not raise equal protection concerns (usually citizens of one 
tribe who commit crimes in the territory of another), or it could interpret it more 
expansively to include anyone, regardless of citizenship status, who is a member 
of the tribal community in which the crime is committed.114 
An outside in approach would conceptualize tribal jurisdiction in 
terms of the gaps left by other governments.  On reservations not affected 
by Public Law 280, the federal government exercises criminal jurisdiction in 
Indian country only as authorized by statute, and federal law covers three 
situations.  The General Crimes Act extended federal enclave laws into In-
dian country, authorizing federal officials to respond to a full range of 
crimes,115 but it only applies to so-called “interracial crimes” (those between 
Indians and non-Indians).116  The Major Crimes Act extended federal jurisdic-
tion to specific enumerated crimes between Indians.117  Finally, the federal gov-
ernment also has jurisdiction over general federal crimes, as it does everywhere, 
  
110. Congress passed a very limited partial fix in 2013 when it restored tribes’ inherent jurisdiction to 
prosecute certain non-Indian domestic violence offenders, see supra note 19, but the general rule 
still holds outside this narrow context. 
111. Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 694 (1990). 
112. See infra notes 129–130. 
113. The law affirms tribal criminal jurisdiction over “all Indians.”  See 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2) (2012).  It 
was passed in direct response to the Duro decision, so it is clear that Congress meant to include 
more than just enrolled citizens of that tribe in the definition of “all Indians.” 
114. The analysis described in this section originally appeared in Addie C. Rolnick, Tribal Criminal 
Jurisdiction Beyond Citizenship and Blood, 39 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 337, 391–408 (2016). 
115. See supra note 31.  Although federal enclave laws do not necessarily define the full range of crimes 
that might be covered under state law, the Assimilative Crimes Act permits federal courts to look 
to the relevant state’s criminal law to fill any definitional gaps.  18 U.S.C. § 13 (2012). 
116. By its terms, the law does not apply to crimes committed “by one Indian against the person or 
property of another Indian.”  18 U.S.C. § 1152 (2012).  It also contains exceptions for crimes by 
Indians where the offender has already been punished by the tribe and for situations where a treaty 
has reserved exclusive jurisdiction to the tribe.  Id. 
117. 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (2012); see supra note 30 (describing the Act and listing crimes). 
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regardless of whether the act occurred on federal land.118  This intersecting 
network of coverage leaves two gaps.  First, according to a longstanding, ju-
dicially created exception to the General Crimes Act, the federal government 
lacks jurisdiction over crimes between non-Indians that occur in Indian 
country.119  States, however, may investigate and prosecute these crimes.120  
Second, the federal government lacks jurisdiction over minor crimes be-
tween Indians.  Prior to Duro, tribal courts prosecuted these crimes,121 but 
the Court’s holding meant that no government could thereafter prosecute 
them. 
Congress was clearly concerned with the consequences of such a gap.  
The Congressional record includes many references to tribes’ loss of “mis-
demeanor jurisdiction” over nonmember Indians.122  The record describes 
the large population of nonmember Indians living on many reservations,123 
and the periodic presence of even more nonmember Indians for powwows, 
Pueblo Feast Days, and other public cultural events.124  Lawmakers,125 law 
  
118. COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 1, § 9.02[3][a] n.150.  Federal 
jurisdiction over these crimes exists because the crime implicates a federal interest, usually interstate 
commerce, whereas Indian country jurisdiction exists because the crime occurred in Indian country, 
which is treated as federal land.  
119. See Draper v. United States, 164 U.S. 240, 247 (1896); United States v. McBratney, 104 U.S. 621, 
624 (1881); see also U.S. Dep’t of Justice, U.S. Attorney’s Manual, tit. 9, § 678 (2014), 
[https://perma.cc/ESS8-NB8M]. 
120. The rationale for the exception outlined in Draper and McBratney was that federal jurisdiction 
would infringe on state sovereignty.  Although the rationale has been largely rejected, the rule 
nevertheless stands, perhaps in part because of practical concerns.  COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF 
FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 1, § 9.03[1]. 
121. Clinton, supra note 3, at 557 n.281; see also H.R. Rep. No. 101-938, at 132–33 (1990) (Conf. Rep.) 
(finding that tribes had been exercising criminal jurisdiction over nonmember Indians for over two 
hundred years). 
122. H.R. Rep. No. 101-938, at 132–33 (“Non-tribal member Indians own property on Indian 
reservations, their children attend tribal schools, their families receive health care from tribal 
hospitals and clinics.”); Impact of Supreme Court’s Ruling in Duro v. Reina: Hearing on S. 962, S. 
963 Before the S. Select Comm. on Indian Affairs, 102d Cong. 24, 137 (1991) (statement of 
Wayne Ducheneaux, President, National Congress of American Indians). 
123. H.R. Rep. No. 101-938, at 133; see Nell Jessup Newton, Permanent Legislation to Correct Duro v. 
Reina, 17 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 109, 109 n.7 (1992) (describing various factors that led to the 
presence of significant numbers of nonmember Indians on most reservations). 
124. The Chief Judge of the Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes explained that “thousands of 
non-member Indians gather on the Reservation each summer for annual pow-wows.”  Hearing on 
S. 962, S. 963, supra note 122, at 146 (statement of Donald Dupuis); see also id. at 181 (“Th[e] 
number of non-member Indians and others increase tremendously on occasions of special events 
such as Shalako (the Zuni New Year’s celebration).”). 
125. See The Duro Decision: Criminal Misdemeanor Jurisdiction in Indian Country, Hearing on H.R. 
972 Before the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, 102d Cong. 33, at 23 (1991) (statement 
of Rep. Bill Richardson expressing concern about a jurisdictional void). 
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enforcement professionals,126 tribal officials,127 and legal advocates128 worried 
about public safety on reservations, arguing that the Court’s ruling left no gov-
ernment with the power to prosecute minor crimes committed by Indians against 
other Indians.  A one-year temporary fix passed within months,129 and the Duro 
fix was made permanent the next year.130 
Likely because of concern over the law enforcement gap, the new law de-
fined the population of people now subject to tribal jurisdiction in terms that mir-
rored the population of people who would be subject to federal jurisdiction but 
for the exception for minor crimes.  The 1990 amendment restoring jurisdiction 
over “all Indians” added a definition of “Indian” as “any person who would be 
subject to the jurisdiction of the United States as an Indian under section 1153, 
title 18, if that person were to commit an offense listed in that section in Indian 
country to which that section applies.”131  Thus, after passage of the Duro fix, 
tribes could prosecute all the same people who would be subject to federal prose-
cution under the Major Crimes Act if they committed a covered offense.  
A person is subject to federal prosecution under the Major Crimes Act as 
long as he or she is of Indian descent and is politically recognized as an Indian132 
by the federal government or a tribal government.133  This definition is drawn 
  
126. Id. at 31–32 (stating the International Association of Chiefs’ position in support of the bill). 
127. Hearing on S.962, S. 963, supra note 122, at 119 (statement of Ronnie Lupe, Chairman of the 
White Mountain Apache Tribe of the Fort Apache Reservation). 
128. Hearing on S. 962, S. 963, supra note 122, at 137 (statement of Wayne Ducheneaux, President of 
the National Congress of American Indians). 
129. Department of Defense Appropriations Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 101-511, tit. VIII, § 8077(b), 
104 Stat. 1856, 1892 (1990) (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2)). 
130. Act of Oct. 28, 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-137, 105 Stat. 646 (removing the original sunset date of 
Sep. 30, 1991 to extend the fix indefinitely). 
131. 25 U.S.C. § 1301(4) (2012). 
132. United States v. Rogers, 45 U.S. 567, 572–73 (1846) (establishing basic test for Indianness under 
federal criminal laws).  For cases applying the Rogers test for prosecutions under sections 1152 and 
1153, see, for example, United States v. Zepeda, 792 F.3d 1103, 1118 (9th Cir. 2015); United 
States v. Bruce, 394 F.3d 1215, 1223 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting United States v. Keys, 103 F.3d 758, 
761 (9th Cir. 1996)) (finding test to consider “degree of Indian blood” and “tribal or government 
recognition as an Indian”); United States v. Prentiss, 273 F.3d 1277, 1280–82 (10th Cir. 2001); 
United States v. Torres, 733 F.2d 449, 456 (7th Cir. 1984); United States v. Dodge, 538 F.2d 770, 
786 (8th Cir. 1976).  For a comparison of the test across circuits, see generally Daniel Donovan & 
John Rhodes, To Be or Not To Be: Who Is an “Indian Person”?, 73 MONT. L. REV. 61 (2012) 
(analyzing variation among the Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuit approaches and considering how 
each test has been applied in specific cases); Brian L. Lewis, Do You Know What You Are? You Are 
What You Is; You Is What You Am: Indian Status for the Purpose of Federal Criminal Jurisdiction and the 
Current Split in the Courts of Appeals, 26 HARV. J. RACIAL & ETHNIC JUST. 241 (2010) 
(comparing the Ninth Circuit’s approach in United States v. Cruz, 554 F.3d 840 (9th Cir. 2009), 
with the Eighth Circuit’s approach in United States v. Stymiest, 581 F.3d 759 (8th Cir. 2009)). 
133. See Bruce, 394 F.3d at 1224–25 (holding that federal recognition is not required and noting that the 
deference to tribal recognition “stems from the recognition that one of an Indian tribe’s most basic 
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from the 1845 case United States v. Rogers.134  The case involved a white man who 
had married a Cherokee woman, lived in Cherokee territory, and had become a 
naturalized citizen under Cherokee law.135  The victim in the case was another 
white man who was also a naturalized citizen through intermarriage.136  Despite 
significant evidence that the tribe recognized Rogers as a member, the Court held 
that he could not escape federal prosecution under an exception to then-existing 
federal law barring federal prosecution of crimes committed by one Indian 
against another Indian.137  Regardless of the tribe’s view as to membership, the 
Court held that a person must also possess some degree of Indian blood in order 
to be considered Indian under federal law.138  Although Rogers concerned the 
classification of a person who was a tribal community member but not descended 
from any tribe, it is the source of the modern rule that defines an Indian as 
someone who has some degree of Indian ancestry and is politically recog-
nized as an Indian by the tribe or by the federal government.   
Tribal citizenship is one way to demonstrate political recognition by a tribal 
government.139  Federal courts agree, however, that a person may be an Indian for 
Major Crimes Act purposes even if he or she is not formally enrolled in any 
tribe.140  For example, Ninth Circuit courts consider four factors, listed in de-
clining order of importance: “1) tribal enrollment; 2) government recognition 
formally and informally through the receipt of assistance reserved only to Indians; 
  
powers is the authority to determine questions of its own membership”); Dodge, 538 F.2d at 786–
87 (noting that courts consider “recognition by a tribe or society of Indians or by the federal 
government”). 
134. Rogers, 45 U.S. at 572–73. 
135. Bethany R. Berger, “Power Over This Unfortunate Race”: Race, Politics and Indian Law in United 
States v. Rogers, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1957, 1960 (2004). 
136. Id. 
137. Rogers, 45 U.S. at 572–73. 
138. Id. at 573.  Varying degrees of Indian blood have been found to be sufficient under federal law, and 
because some tribes require only descent from an enrolled member, but not a particular quantum of 
Indian blood, it would be problematic for federal courts to impose a blood quantum floor that 
would effectively exclude some enrolled members. 
139. Every circuit to have considered the issue has held that formal tribal citizenship alone is sufficient to 
meet the political recognition prong of the test.  See, e.g., United States v. Zepeda, 792 F.3d 1103, 
1115 (9th Cir. 2015); United States v. Stymiest, 581 F.3d 759, 764 (8th Cir. 2009); United States 
v. Drewry, 365 F.3d 957, 961 (10th Cir. 2004); St. Cloud v. United States, 702 F. Supp. 1456, 
1461 (D.S.D. 1988); United States v. Torres, 733 F.2d 449, 456 (7th Cir. 1984); United States v. 
Lossiah, 537 F.2d 1250, 1251 (4th Cir. 1976). 
140. United States v. LaBuff, 658 F.3d 873, 877 (9th Cir. 2011); United States v. Bruce, 394 F.3d 1215, 
1224–25 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing numerous cases holding that lack of enrollment is not 
determinative and rejecting dissent’s proposal to adopt enrollment as the single determining factor); 
United States v. Pemberton, 405 F.3d 656, 660 (8th Cir. 2005); Drewry, 365 F.3d at 961; United 
States v. Broncheau, 597 F.2d 1260, 1262–63 (9th Cir. 1979) (holding that enrollment is not an 
absolute requirement for proving Indianness); Ex parte Pero, 99 F.2d 28, 31 (7th Cir. 1938). 
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3) enjoyment of the benefits of tribal affiliation; and 4) social recognition as an 
Indian through residence on a reservation and participation in Indian social 
life.”141  Courts in the Eighth Circuit consider a non-exhaustive list of five factors, 
with no one factor (besides formal enrollment) being accorded more importance 
than the others:142 (1) enrollment, (2) governmental recognition through receipt 
of assistance, (3) tribal recognition via tribal court prosecution, (4) enjoying the 
benefits of tribal affiliation, and (5) social recognition as an Indian, including self-
identification.143  Courts in the Seventh Circuit use a totality of the circumstances 
approach, with relevant factors including tribal recognition, federal recognition, 
residence on a reservation, and “whether a person holds himself out as an Indi-
an.”144  The Tenth Circuit also uses a “totality-of-the evidence” approach.145  De-
spite some variation, all of these tests acknowledge that membership in a tribal 
political community may be informal.146  In other words, the Indian jurisdictional 
category for purposes of federal criminal law includes more than just formal citi-
zens of the tribe.   
Because the Duro fix, which affirmed tribal jurisdiction, took its definition 
directly from a statute creating federal jurisdiction, it can be difficult to disaggre-
gate questions about whom a tribe can prosecute from questions about whom the 
federal government can prosecute.  Notwithstanding the different issues impli-
cated by the two questions, though, it seems clear that tribes can at least prosecute 
a person who is not enrolled in any tribe as long as that person satisfies the Rogers 
  
141. Zepeda, 792 F.3d at 1114; LaBuff, 658 F.3d at 877; United States v. Cruz, 554 F.3d 840, 846 (9th 
Cir. 2009); Bruce, 394 F.3d at 1224 (quoting United States v. Lawrence, 51 F.3d 150, 152 (8th Cir. 
1995)) (listing factors relevant to determining Indianness as a defense to a prosecution under § 
1152). 
142. Lewis, supra note 132, at 242 (noting that the Eighth Circuit’s factors are “illustrative” while the 
Ninth Circuit’s factors are “exhaustive”). 
143. See Stymiest, 581 F.3d at 763. 
144. See Torres, 733 F.2d at 456 (approving jury instruction listing these factors but advocating a “totality 
of circumstances” approach). 
145. United States v. Diaz, 679 F.3d 1183, 1187 (10th Cir. 2012). 
146. Courts have considered receipt of tribal services or benefits, prior exercise of jurisdiction by a tribal 
court, formal non-citizen status under tribal law, cultural and social participation, social 
recognition, residence on the reservation, and self-identification or self-presentation.  E.g., Stymiest, 
581 F.3d at 764–65 (considering self-presentation, prior tribal court prosecution, social 
recognition); Cruz, 554 F.3d at 846–47 (considering prior tribal prosecution, descendant status, 
reservation residence, and lack of participation in cultural activities); United States v. Pemberton, 
405 F.3d 656, 660 (8th Cir. 2005) (considering self-presentation and reservation residence); 
United States v. Drewry, 365 F.3d 957, 961 (10th Cir. 2004) (holding that participation in tribal 
summer program and social life and prior tribal child welfare involvement were sufficient to support 
a finding that the victims were Indian in a prosecution of a non-Indian defendant under § 1152); 
United States v. Dodge, 538 F.2d 770, 787 (8th Cir. 1976) (considering self-presentation); United 
States v. Driver, 755 F. Supp. 885, 889 (D.S.D. 1991), aff’d 945 F.2d 1410 (8th Cir. 1991) 
(considering lack of social participation a factor in holding that defendant was not an Indian). 
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test as set forth in the factor tests employed by federal appellate courts.  Yet, fed-
eral and tribal courts considering the legality of tribal prosecutions under the Du-
ro fix law have repeatedly assumed that a person is Indian only if he or she is a 
formal citizen of a tribe, an assumption that makes the scope of tribal criminal ju-
risdiction narrower than the scope of federal criminal jurisdiction. 
One reason that courts have tended to equate Indianness with formal tribal 
citizenship is that judicial analyses of the Duro fix law have focused on the legality 
of federal power, rather than the question of whom tribes can fairly prosecute.  
One question is whether Congress has the power to restore inherent tribal juris-
diction over nonmember Indians.  The Supreme Court resolved this question in 
United States v. Lara.147  Billy Jo Lara, who was enrolled in the Turtle Mountain 
Chippewa tribe but was related to the Spirit Lake tribe through marriage and res-
idence,148 argued that he could not be prosecuted by a federal court after being 
prosecuted by the Spirit Lake court for the same crime because the Duro fix had 
simply delegated a federal power to tribes, so the later federal prosecution was 
barred by double jeopardy rules.149  The Supreme Court held that Congress had 
the power to restore an inherent power previously held by tribes, as opposed to 
simply delegating a new power, and that it meant to do so.150  The Court’s analy-
sis, therefore, focused on the breadth of Congress’ power over Indian affairs, 
which it viewed as encompassing the question of who would be included in the 
Indian category.151  Billy Jo Lara could be prosecuted in federal court because his 
prior tribal prosecution was rooted in the tribe’s inherent sovereignty, so he was 
not put in jeopardy twice by the same sovereign. 
Another question, one that has not been resolved by the Supreme Court, is 
whether Congress can permissibly subject individual Indians to special jurisdic-
tional rules without running afoul of equal protection guarantees.152  In Means v. 
  
147. 541 U.S. 193 (2004). 
148. Id. at 196. 
149. Id. at 197–98. 
150. Id. at 198–200.  
151.  Id. at 203 (describing past Congressional actions terminating or recognizing the Indian tribal status 
of certain entities). 
152. Billy Jo Lara also raised due process and equal protection arguments.  He argued that a tribe’s 
prosecution of any nonmember Indian would violate the U.S. Constitution because the statute’s 
reference to “all Indians” involves a classification that is “race based and without justification,” as 
well as because tribes lack the power to try a group of U.S. citizens who were not politically 
included in the tribe.  Id. at 209.  As the Court noted, success on these arguments would render 
Lara’s tribal court prosecution invalid, but they would not transform it into a federal prosecution.  
Because the case arose when Lara challenged his subsequent federal prosecution on double 
jeopardy grounds, only his argument that the tribe was exercising a delegated federal power in its 
earlier prosecution would affect the outcome in his federal case.  Id. 
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Navajo Nation,153 Russell Means, a citizen of the Oglala Sioux Tribe who had 
lived for a decade on the Navajo reservation with his Navajo wife,154 was charged 
in a Navajo Nation court after he threatened and battered his father-in-law, an 
Omaha tribal member, and another Navajo man.155  Means challenged the tribal 
court prosecution, arguing that, to the extent the Duro fix law permitted the Nav-
ajo Nation to prosecute him because he was an “Indian,” it amounted to an illegal 
racial classification.156  The Ninth Circuit disagreed, holding that the law was not 
unconstitutional as applied to Means.157  As in Lara, the court’s main concern 
was the power of Congress over Indians, although Means’s argument forced the 
Ninth Circuit to more squarely address whether Congress could carve out a class 
of “Indian” people for special legal treatment. 
While it seemed clear to all the parties that a tribe’s prosecution of its own 
citizens (clearly supported by federal common law158) did not present a constitu-
tional problem, whether Congress could subject an Indian who was not a tribal 
citizen to tribal prosecution simply because that person was an “Indian” was a 
harder question.  Nearly thirty years earlier, however, the Supreme Court had 
upheld the laws that subjected Indian people to federal criminal jurisdiction as a 
legitimate exercise of Congress’s power over Indian affairs,159 reasoning that 
“respondents were not subjected to federal criminal jurisdiction because they 
are of the Indian race but because they are enrolled members of the Coeur 
D’Alene Tribe.”160  This case made the court’s task in Means v. Navajo Nation 
much easier because Means was an enrolled citizen of the Oglala Sioux Tribe 
and thus easily qualified as an Indian under federal law for a “non-racial” rea-
son.161  The Supreme Court in Lara seemed to envision a similar scope for the 
Indian legal category when it characterized the Duro fix law as an attempt by 
  
153. 432 F.3d 924 (9th Cir. 2005). 
154. Id. at 927. 
155. See id.; see also Means v. Dist. Court of Chinle Judicial Dist., 2 Am. Tribal Law 439, 444–45 
(Navajo 1999) (Navajo Supreme Court decision setting forth facts and holding that tribal court had 
jurisdiction to prosecute Means). 
156. A similar argument was raised and rejected in Morris v. Tanner, 288 F. Supp. 2d 1133, 1141–43 
(D. Mont. 2003), but in that case the tribe’s law required that a person be “an enrolled member of a 
federally-recognized tribe” in order to be prosecuted in tribal court.  Id. at 1137.  Because that 
tribe’s law expressly required citizenship, the court did not have occasion to consider whether tribal 
citizenship is always a prerequisite for tribal criminal prosecution. 
157. Means, 432 F.3d at 937. 
158. See United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 322 (1978); Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, 380 
(1896). 
159. See United States v. Antelope, 430 U.S. 641, 642–43 (1977). 
160. Id. at 646. 
161. Means, 432 F.3d at 934–35 (emphasizing Means’s tribal citizenship). 
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Congress to restore tribal criminal jurisdiction over “Indian members of a differ-
ent tribe.”162 
This assumption that the Duro fix restored criminal jurisdiction over In-
dians who are citizens of tribes other than the prosecuting tribe provides an 
easy rejoinder to an equal protection challenge in light of Morton v. Mancari,163 
widely cited for the idea that federal classifications involving Indians are “politi-
cal, rather than racial,” in part because they are based on a person’s membership in 
a politically recognized Indian tribe, rather than on a person’s racial Indianness.164  
It also mirrors the concerns expressed during Congressional consideration of the 
Duro fix about Indians from other tribes who lived or worked in a second tribe’s 
territory or who visited for cultural events.165  Nearly every case in which a federal 
court has been asked to review the legality of a tribe’s exercise of criminal jurisdic-
tion over a nonmember Indian involved a defendant who was enrolled in another 
tribe.  Indeed, in most cases in which tribal courts prosecute nonmember Indians, 
the defendants are probably enrolled citizens of other tribes.  Courts thus have 
had little occasion to consider whether formal citizenship in a tribe is an absolute 
  
162. United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 198 (2004). 
163. 417 U.S. 535 (1974). 
164. E.g., Washington v. Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass’n, 443 U.S. 658, 
673 n.20 (1979) (citing Mancari for the proposition that Indian treaty rights do not violate equal 
protection principles because “the peculiar semisovereign and constitutionally recognized status of 
Indians justifies special treatment on their behalf when rationally related to the Government’s 
‘unique obligation toward the Indians’”); Fisher v. Dist. Court, 424 U.S. 382, 390–91 (1976) 
(relying on Mancari to hold that exclusive tribal jurisdiction over an adoption that involved only 
tribal members domiciled on the reservation is not impermissible racial discrimination even if it 
denies tribal members access to a state forum because “disparate treatment of the Indian is justified 
because it is intended to benefit the class of which he is a member by furthering the congressional 
policy of Indian self-government”); Moe v. Conf. Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 425 U.S. 463, 480 
(1976) (relying on Mancari to reject an argument that tax exemptions for Indians on reservations 
violate equal protection principles); Am. Fed’n of Gov’t Emps. v. United States, 330 F.3d 513 
(D.C. Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1088 (2003) (upholding exceptions to restrictive federal 
contracting rules for Indian- or Alaska Native-owned firms under Mancari standard).  For a 
thorough analysis of Mancari and the “political, rather than racial” rule in federal Indian law, see 
generally Rolnick, supra note 74. 
165. See supra notes 122–128 (describing legislative history).  But see Hearing on S. 962, S. 963, supra 
note 122, at 137 (statement of Wayne Ducheneaux, President, National Congress of American 
Indians) (describing nonmember Indian category as including Indians enrolled in other tribes 
and Indians not enrolled anywhere); id. at 218 (statement of Professor Nell Jessup Newton) 
(advocating elimination of language defining Indian in terms of membership and referring to 
Indians who are not enrolled anywhere, a group she described as “much larger than many people 
realize”); Hearing on H.R. 972, supra note 125, at 153–58 (oral and written testimony of Professor 
Richard Collins) (explaining that formal enrollment does not necessarily reflect the traditional view 
about who is part of a tribal community). 
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requirement for prosecution as an Indian under the Duro fix.166 An outside in fo-
cus on filling gaps and justifying federal actions does not invite a deeper analysis 
about whom tribes may punish and why. 
The question whether tribes have criminal jurisdiction over people who are 
not enrolled in any tribe finally came before the Nevada district court in 2014.167  
Christopher Phebus was a citizen of the Las Vegas Paiute Tribe until he 
was involuntarily disenrolled as a result of an internal review of enrollment 
criteria.168  After his disenrollment, he continued to live on the reservation as a 
member of the community, contesting his disenrollment through appeals to the 
tribal court and tribal council.169  During this time, he was convicted of a crime 
and sentenced to six months in jail by the tribal court.170  The tribe’s appellate 
court vacated his conviction, holding that the tribe lacked criminal jurisdic-
tion.171  The court reasoned that, as a result of the disenrollment, Phebus no 
longer qualified as an “Indian” under federal laws defining the limits of tribal ju-
risdiction, and held that “Indian” in the context of tribal prosecution includes 
only enrolled tribal citizens.172 
The tribal court’s statement misread federal common law, which clearly 
does not require enrolled citizenship to qualify as Indian.  Tribal communities in-
clude many people who are not formally enrolled citizens.  This may be true for 
several reasons: Some people are descended from tribal members but do not meet 
the minimum blood quantum requirements of their tribes;173 some tribes are 
matrilineal or patrilineal, so they only permit members of a certain gender to 
enroll their children in the tribe;174 some people who are eligible for citizenship 
  
166. Despite their reliance on the defendant’s tribal citizenship to justify prosecution, federal courts have 
acknowledged that tribal citizenship is not a requirement for demonstrating political Indianness.  
See United States v. Antelope, 430 U.S. 641, 647 n.7 (1977); Means, 432 F.3d at 934–35. 
167. Las Vegas Tribe of Paiute Indians v. Phebus, 5 F. Supp. 3d 1221 (D. Nev. 2014). 
168. Id. at 1225; see also Lynnette Curtis, Cast Out of Paiute Tribe, Disenrolled Confront Struggles, LAS 
VEGAS REV.-J. (Apr. 22, 2012, 1:59 AM), http://www.review journal.com/news/las-vegas/cast-
out-paiute-tribe-disenrolled-confront-struggles [http://perma.cc/3CUN-A47A] (discussing the 
background and aftermath of the decision that led to Phebus’ disenrollment). 
169. Phebus, 5 F. Supp. 3d at 1225; Interview with Tribal Attorney Patrick Murch (Mar. 28, 2014). 
170. Phebus, 5 F. Supp. 3d at 1226. 
171. Id.; see also Phebus v. Las Vegas Paiute Tribe, No. CA13-001 (Las Vegas Paiute Ct. App. June 10, 
2013). 
172. Phebus, No. CA13-001, at 3. 
173. See, e.g., JILL DOERFLER, THOSE WHO BELONG: IDENTITY, FAMILY, BLOOD, AND 
CITIZENSHIP AMONG THE WHITE EARTH ANISHINAABEG xii, 61–90 (2015) (describing how 
White Earth constitutional revision was driven in large part by a desire to change the one-fourth 
blood quantum requirement for citizenship); MELISSA L. TATUM ET AL., STRUCTURING 
SOVEREIGNTY: CONSTITUTIONS OF NATIVE NATIONS 46 (2014). 
174. See, e.g., Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 52 n.2 (1978) (citing ordinance enacted in 
1939 and in effect for over seventy years disallowing membership in Santa Clara Pueblo to children 
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simply have not followed the official procedures to enroll; and some people are 
not descended from that tribe at all but are related through marriage or adoption.  
Some of these people are enrolled in other tribes (for instance, a child of parents 
from two different tribes may be enrolled in one parent’s tribe, but not in the oth-
er), but some are not enrolled anywhere.175 
Christopher Phebus’s vacated conviction exemplifies the danger of an 
outside in analysis that fails to interrogate the scope of tribal jurisdiction on 
its own terms.  Following the shortcuts taken by federal courts, which relied 
on tribal citizenship as the easiest way to define and uphold the Indian legal 
category and avoid an equal protection challenge, the Las Vegas Paiute Court 
of Appeals assumed that a person could not qualify as an Indian under federal law 
and therefore could not be prosecuted under the Duro fix if he was not a tribal cit-
izen.  But this understanding of who counts as a nonmember Indian is too 
narrow.  The Duro fix statute itself refers to the federal law rule for determin-
ing Indianness,176 which clearly recognizes that a person who is not enrolled 
in any tribe may nevertheless be an Indian. 
An inside out analysis that centers tribal law helps to clarify who might be 
included in this nonmember Indian category.  In a recent article, I analyzed tribal 
statutory and common law in order to gain insight into how tribes articulate the 
proper scope of their jurisdiction under tribal law.177 Some tribal criminal codes 
employ a “community recognition” test to determine Indianness for purposes of 
tribal criminal jurisdiction.178  This test asks whether the defendant is considered 
to be an Indian by the community.  It acknowledges that community recognition 
may be expressed in a variety of ways, including informal indices of belonging.  It 
rejects the federal government’s overreliance on citizenship, political participa-
tion, or receipt of governmental services as the appropriate determinant of be-
longing, at least for purposes of criminal jurisdiction.179  A community 
  
born of female members and male nonmembers); Genealogy, SENECA NATION OF INDIANS, 
http://www.sni.org/Culture/Genealogy.aspx [https://perma.cc/96D2-FSJ2] (“[T]he mother must 
be an enrolled member in order for the children to be enrolled.”). 
175. Some may be members of a tribe that is not formally recognized by the U.S. government.  
Members of those tribes may not qualify as Indians for most federal law purposes and thus could be 
treated the same way as non-Indians if the standard used relied on enrollment in a recognized tribe.  
E.g., United States v. Maggi, 598 F.3d 1073, 1080 (9th Cir. 2010) (maintaining that an enrolled 
member of Little Shell Band of Chippewa was not an Indian for purposes of federal prosecution 
because the tribe was not recognized), overruled in part, United States v. Zepeda, 792 F.3d 1103 
(9th Cir. 2015); LaPier v. McCormick, 986 F.2d 303, 305 (9th Cir. 1993). 
176. See 25 U.S.C. § 1301(4) (2012) (defining Indian with reference to 18 U.S.C. § 1153). 
177. See Rolnick, supra note 114, at 391–408. 
178. See id. at 389. 
179. Id. at 391–408. 
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recognition standard could permit the exercise of criminal jurisdiction over peo-
ple affiliated with the governing tribe who may not be eligible for enrollment 
because they do not meet blood quantum requirements or because the tribe de-
termines eligibility for enrollment based on descent from either the mother or 
the father and the defendant is descended from the other parent.180  It could also 
permit prosecution of adopted or intermarried people even if those people are not 
eligible for citizenship or particular tribal rights.181  It acknowledges that a person 
may be connected to a tribal community in a variety of ways, from legal rights and 
benefits to residence, family ties, and cultural and social participation. 
The standard provides an alternative basis for upholding tribal court juris-
diction to that used in Lara and Means.182  Although the federal courts in those 
cases focused on the defendants’ status as enrolled citizens of other tribes, both 
were also members of the local tribal community.183  They were married to tribal 
members, had family within the tribe, and lived and worked in the community.184  
Their crimes arose out of their relationships with other tribal community mem-
bers.185  Indeed, Means’s Oglala citizenship was irrelevant to the Navajo court, 
which based its jurisdiction instead on his relationship to the Navajo Nation, as 
governed by Navajo common law. 
While there is a formal process to obtain membership as a Navajo, 
that is not the only kind of “membership” under Navajo Nation law.  
An individual who marries or has an intimate relationship with a 
Navajo is a hadane (in-law).  The Navajo People have adoone’e or 
clans, and many of them are based upon the intermarriage of original 
Navajo clan members with people of other nations.  The primary clan 
relation is traced through the mother . . . . A hadane or in-law as-
sumes a clan relation to a Navajo when an intimate relationship 
forms, and when that relationship is conducted within the Navajo 
  
180. See, e.g., E. Band of Cherokee Indians v. Lambert, No. CR 03-0313, 2003 WL 25902446, at *3 
(E. Cherokee Ct. May 29, 2003) (holding that the tribe could prosecute a first descendant of a 
tribal member who was herself ineligible for membership in part because first descendants “are 
participating members of this community and [are] treated . . . as such”). 
181. E.g., Means v. Dist. Court of Chinle Judicial Dist., 2 Am. Tribal Law 439, 450 (Navajo 1999) 
(holding that the tribe could prosecute a person who was not enrolled in the tribe but who held the 
status of hadane, or in-law, under Navajo common law). 
182. United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193 (2004); Means v. Navajo Nation, 432 F.3d 924 (9th Cir. 
2005). 
183. See supra notes 148, 154–155 (discussing Lara and Means). 
184. Id. 
185. See supra notes 291–292. 
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Nation, there are reciprocal obligations to and from family and clan 
members under Navajo common law.186 
Community recognition is an alternative way to define the Indian legal category, 
one that retains the political aspect of Indian classifications187 without focusing 
narrowly on one form of community affiliation.  Although it does not provide a 
bright line rule, it permits tribal courts to develop more detailed standards that re-
flect community norms.188  In most cases, a community recognition standard 
would broaden the scope of tribal criminal jurisdiction as compared to a citizens-
only standard.189  Indeed, if Indianness for purposes of tribal criminal jurisdiction 
were defined only according to community recognition, without reference to the 
Rogers rule, tribes would be permitted to prosecute recognized community mem-
bers regardless of ancestry.190 
In response to the tribal appellate court’s ruling in Phebus, the Las Vegas 
Paiute Tribe asked the Nevada district court to issue a declaratory judgment that 
jurisdiction was proper.191  The federal court granted it in part, holding that a 
tribal court may prosecute anyone who would qualify as an Indian under federal 
law, including people who are not enrolled.192  The court observed that the Duro 
fix referred to the federal standard (drawn from Rogers) for determining Indi-
anness under the Major Crimes Act.193  Turning to the Ninth Circuit’s cases 
  
186. Dist. Court of Chinle, 2 Am. Tribal Law at 450. 
187. See Rolnick, supra note 114, at 423 (“At its most basic level, the ‘Indian’ legal category refers to 
indigenous groups recognized as having a government-to-government relationship with the 
United States, and the people with sufficiently strong connections to those recognized groups to be 
fairly within the reach of laws arising out of that relationship.”). 
188.  Rolnick, supra note 114, at 403–08. 
189.  But see Rolnick, supra note 114, at 445–46 (noting that a community recognition standard could in 
some cases result in no jurisdiction whereas another standard would have permitted it and explain-
ing that the idea of a community recognition standard is not intended to foreclose the possibility 
that tribes may also exercise criminal jurisdiction over strangers who are citizens of other tribes un-
der a different rationale, as set forth in the federal cases discussed here). 
190. The Navajo hadane doctrine is not limited to people of Indian descent.  See Dist. Court of Chinle, 2 
Am. Tribal Law at 450.  Congress employed a standard similar to community recognition when it 
restored to tribes criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians who have sufficient “ties to the 
[prosecuting] Indian tribe” and commit crimes of domestic or dating violence against Indian 
people.  25 U.S.C. § 1304.  In a recent concurring opinion, Judge Alex Kozinski of the U.S. Court 
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit seemed to assume that tribes include members who are not of 
Indian descent.  He advocated eliminating the descent prong of the Rogers test for federal 
jurisdiction purposes and applying the Major Crimes Act to all tribal members “irrespective of their 
race,” a change he believed would address his concern regarding equal protection.  Zepeda, 792 F.3d 
at 1106; see Rolnick, supra note 114, at 422–27. 
191. Las Vegas Tribe of Paiute Indians v. Phebus, 5 F. Supp. 3d 1221, 1226 (D. Nev. 2014). 
192. Id. at 1230–31. 
193. Id. at 1236. 
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applying the standard, the court correctly held that a non-citizen may still be 
an Indian.194 
Although the district court’s opinion is the product of a considered analysis, 
it still failed to center tribes.  The court suggested that it would never be permissi-
ble for a tribal court to prosecute someone after severing his formal citizenship in 
that community unless he also had a tie to a different tribal community.195  Had 
the court considered the possibility of a community recognition test under tribal 
law, rather than considering only Ninth Circuit case law, it might have acknowl-
edged that a person may still be considered a community member after being 
involuntarily disenrolled if he or she continues to live and participate in the 
community.196  By removing the specter of a federal restriction, however, the 
court opened the door for the tribal courts to consider issues like fairness, due 
process, and involuntary disenrollment as matters of tribal law.  In Phebus, such 
an analysis could have led the tribal appellate court to hold that the tribe retained 
jurisdiction because of Phebus’s non-citizenship ties, or it could have led to a 
holding that it was unfair under Las Vegas Paiute law for the tribe to prosecute 
Phebus after disenrolling him.  Either outcome, however, would have been 
rooted in the work of tribal criminal law rather than in overbroad assumptions 
about federal limitations on tribal power. 
IV. EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION 
Criminal jurisdiction is most often described as an aspect of a sover-
eign’s control over territory.197  A tribe’s territory is usually understood to 
mean the “Indian country” controlled by that tribe, but the two are not neces-
sarily coterminous.  Indian country is statutorily defined to include lands within 
the boundaries of that tribe’s reservation, lands held in trust for the tribe or its 
members, including individual allotments, and lands that qualify as “dependent 
Indian communities,”198 a limited category of lands owned by tribes in fee but 
treated like trust land.  Any land owned or governed by a tribe that does not fall 
  
194. Id. at 1229–31. 
195. Id. at 1232 (“[T]he Court has no problem ruling that equal protection principles prevent a tribe’s 
prosecution of a non-member whose only putative tribal affiliation is with the prosecuting tribe 
itself and where that tribe has in fact rejected or revoked the person’s membership.”). 
196. See Rolnick, supra note 114, at 406. 
197. ALEJANDRO CHEHTMAN, THE PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF EXTRATERRITORIAL 
PUNISHMENT 56 (2010) (“The territorial scope of a state’s criminal law is commonly regarded as a 
manifestation of its sovereignty.”).  Because of this, most sovereigns are recognized as having 
criminal jurisdiction over anyone who commits a crime within that sovereign’s territory, regardless 
of that person’s citizenship or residence. 
198. 25 U.S.C. § 1151 (2012). 
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within this statutory definition is not Indian country.  Indian country does not in-
clude most Alaska Native lands and does not include land (even land adjacent to 
the reservation) that a tribal government might buy on the open market and own 
outright.  
Indian country is a term defined by federal law to describe the limits of fed-
eral criminal jurisdiction.199  Indian country is also significant as a limit on state 
jurisdiction because it describes land within the boundaries of a state over which 
the federal government has authority, which preempts state authority.200  No 
specific federal statute defines Indian country as a limit on tribal jurisdiction, 
although tribal criminal jurisdiction is often assumed to exist only in Indian 
country.  It is possible, for example, that tribally owned fee land adjacent to a 
reservation could be considered part of that tribe’s territory for purposes of defin-
ing the scope of its criminal jurisdiction, but not qualify as Indian country under 
the federal criminal statute. 
In 1976, Professor Clinton questioned whether tribes retain jurisdiction to 
prosecute people otherwise subject to tribal jurisdiction for crimes committed 
outside Indian country.201  For example, a tribe might wish to exercise criminal 
jurisdiction over an offense that occurred in tribal territory that does not qualify 
as Indian country, or it might wish to do so in order to reach offenses commit-
ted extraterritorially but affecting the tribe or its members.202  Professor Clinton 
raised this question in the wake of a 1974 Ninth Circuit opinion upholding the 
Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakama Indian Nation’s prosecution of 
Alvin and Mary Settler for fishing in violation of tribal fishing regulations.203  
The violations occurred outside the reservation boundaries at one of the tribe’s 
“usual and accustomed fishing places,” where the tribe retained treaty-protected 
rights to hunt and fish.204  That case, Settler v. Lameer, raised the possibility that 
tribes retain some extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction, but whether it stood for 
  
199. Id. 
200. In matters of Indian country criminal jurisdiction, federal jurisdiction usually preempts state 
jurisdiction over the same offender/offense, and vice versa.  See, e.g., supra note 119 (describing 
judicially created exception to federal criminal statutes reserving jurisdiction over non-Indians on 
non-Indian crimes to states exclusively) and notes 76–78 (explaining that Public Law 280 
substituted state for federal jurisdiction, at least in the mandatory states). 
201. See supra notes 3–7. 
202. In the international criminal context, sovereigns exercise extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction over 
citizens and nationals who commit crimes abroad; over crimes that harm their citizens or their 
nationals; over crimes that impact national security or important governmental functions; and over 
universally condemned offenses, such as terrorism.  See Christopher L. Blakesley, Extraterritorial 
Jurisdiction, in 2 INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: MULTILATERAL AND BILATERAL 
ENFORCEMENT MECHANISMS 85, 108, 116 (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 3d ed. 2008). 
203. Settler v. Lameer, 507 F.2d 231, 242 (1974). 
204. Id. at 233–34. 
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the idea that tribes in general retain extraterritorial criminal power was not 
clear.205  The case was unique because it involved tribal enforcement of off-
reservation hunting and fishing rights, so the crime occurred on land that, while 
not Indian country, was subject to a special form of treaty-protected tribal proper-
ty right.206 
In the decades since Professor Clinton raised the question, Settler’s signifi-
cance has faded.  In its place, some authorities adopted the untested assumption 
that tribal criminal jurisdiction is limited to Indian country.  The effect of such a 
rule is no small matter.  Over two hundred Alaska Native governments exercise 
authority over regions that are not considered Indian country under federal 
law.207  The State of Alaska has long taken the position that its criminal authority 
is exclusive.208  Other tribes have only very small pockets of trust land,209 still oth-
ers retain traditional rights to lands outside of their reservations,210 and many 
tribal communities cover a span much larger than their official reservation of trust 
land.211  For these tribes, limiting criminal jurisdiction to lands that qualify as In-
dian country could significantly restrict their ability to deal with offenders.  In ad-
dition, such a rule would certainly prohibit tribes from prosecuting crimes 
committed outside tribal territory but affecting important tribal interests. 
After Settler and prior to 2015, only two federal courts had consid-
ered whether tribes’ retained power to prosecute their members for inter-
nal criminal matters212 extends to offenses committed outside of Indian 
  
205. Clinton, supra note 3, at 558–59. 
206. Settler, 507 F.2d at 235–38. 
207. See Alaska v. Native Vill. of Venetie Tribal Gov’t, 522 U.S. 520, 523 (1998).  But see Geoffrey D. 
Strommer, Stephen D. Osborne & Craig A. Jacobson, Placing Land Into Trust in Alaska: Issues and 
Opportunities, 3 AM. INDIAN L.J. 508, 511–17, 520–23 (2015) (describing proposed regulations to 
permit the Secretary of the Interior to take land into trust for Alaska Native villages and the 
consequences of this for “Indian country” status and criminal jurisdiction). 
208. Indian Law & Order Comm’n, supra note 8, at 44–45.  
209. See, e.g., Delen Goldberg & Jackie Valley, Las Vegas’ Smallest Sovereign Nation, LAS VEGAS SUN 
(July 20, 2015, 2:00 AM), http://lasvegassun.com/news/2015/jul/20/las-vegas-smallest-sovereign-
nation [https://perma.cc/BC84-MV4C] (describing initial reservation of the Las Vegas Paiute 
Tribe as a “31-acre plot”). 
210. See GREAT LAKES INDIAN FISH & WILDLIFE COMM’N, A GUIDE TO UNDERSTANDING 
OJIBWE TREATY RIGHTS 3–4 (2014) (displaying a map of ceded lands, outside reservation 
boundaries, within which Ojibwe signatory tribes exercise treaty-protected rights to hunt, fish, and 
gather, and where tribal regulation of those rights applies); see also Settler v. Lameer, 507 F.2d 231, 
237–38 (1974) (holding that a tribe’s power to regulate hunting and fishing in treaty-protected 
lands includes the right to prosecute members for violation of the tribe’s laws). 
211. See, e.g., JAMES M. MCCLURKEN, OUR PEOPLE, OUR JOURNEY: THE LITTLE RIVER BAND 
OF OTTAWA INDIANS 270–72 (2009) (describing the Band’s service area, where half its members 
reside, as extending beyond reservation boundaries and encompassing parts of nine Michigan 
counties). 
212. See United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313 (1978); Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376 (1896).  
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country.213  In the 2011 case Fife v. Moore, a federal district court in Oklahoma 
held that the Muscogee (Creek) Nation could not prosecute tribal members for 
thefts that occurred on fee land outside of Indian country.214  The court relied 
primarily on the federal statute defining Indian country and on several statements 
in federal cases referring to federal and tribal jurisdiction as being limited to Indi-
an country.215 
In Kelsey v. Pope, a Michigan court in 2014 relied on Fife to reach the same 
conclusion that tribes may not exercise criminal jurisdiction outside Indian coun-
try, even over a tribal citizen engaged in official tribal business.216  The Little Riv-
er Band of Ottawa Indians had convicted Norbert Kelsey, a former tribal council 
member, of sexual assault after he inappropriately touched a tribal employee dur-
ing a meeting of tribal elders at the Band’s community center.  Although Kelsey 
was both a citizen and a government official who committed a crime relating to 
his leadership role while in a government building, he argued that the Band 
lacked jurisdiction because the community center was not located within reserva-
tion boundaries and thus was not Indian country.217  The federal district court 
agreed, and granted Kelsey’s habeas petition.218 
While poorly reasoned, these opinions derive support from general 
statements in treatises and articles suggesting that tribal criminal jurisdiction 
exists only in Indian country.219  Both courts employed an outside in approach 
by emphasizing the lack of evidence that tribes regularly exercised extraterri-
torial jurisdiction and the lack of external confirmation of such jurisdiction.  
  
213. See supra text accompanying note 198 (defining Indian country). 
214. See Fife v. Moore, 808 F. Supp. 2d 1310, 1314–15 (E.D. Okla. 2011).   
215. Id. at 1314–15. 
216. See Kelsey v. Pope, No. 1:09-CV-1015, 2014 WL 1338170, at *3–4, *17 (W.D. Mich. Mar. 31, 
2014), rev’d and vacated, 809 F.3d 849 (6th Cir. 2016).  
217. Id. at 852. 
218. Id. 
219. The magistrate’s recommendation in Kelsey, adopted as part of the district court’s opinion, relies on 
a statement from a respected Indian law treatise that tribal jurisdiction is “generally confined to 
crimes committed within the geographical limits of its reservation . . . .”  Kelsey, 2014 WL 
1338170, at *14 (quoting WILLIAM CANBY, AMERICAN INDIAN LAW IN A NUTSHELL 175 
(4th ed. 2004)).  No authority is given for the statement in the treatise about territorial limitation; 
in fact, it is followed by examples of jurisdiction beyond Indian country, including Settler and 
“certain cases of juvenile delinquency.”  Canby, supra, at 175.  Similarly, the most recent edition 
of Cohen’s Handbook of Federal Indian Law includes the statement, “tribes possess the power to 
exercise at least concurrent jurisdiction over all crimes committed by an Indian against the person 
or property of another Indian in Indian country,” COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN 
LAW, supra note 1, § 9.04, which could be read to suggest a territorial limitation.  Elsewhere, 
however, the 2012 Handbook recognizes that tribes retain broad authority over members, 
including criminal jurisdiction, and that a tribe’s membership-based jurisdiction is not 
necessarily limited by territory.  Id. at §§ 4.01[2][d]; 6.02[1].    
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As a result, both courts concluded that tribes do not have extraterritorial criminal 
jurisdiction.220  These courts limited the application of Settler to situations in 
which tribes employed criminal sanctions to enforce regulations concerning 
their members’ exercise of reserved rights in areas outside of Indian country but 
recognized by treaties.221 
The issue that has generated the most scholarly debate regarding tribal 
criminal jurisdiction has been the Court’s holding in Oliphant that tribes have 
less than full territorial criminal jurisdiction.  Arguments that Congress 
ought to restore full territorial jurisdiction to tribes rely on the longstanding 
link between territory and criminal jurisdiction.222  In light of this focus on 
territory, scholars have been comparatively unconcerned with the question of 
jurisdiction beyond tribal territory, and examples abound of Indian law scholars 
and courts describing tribal jurisdiction as extending only to Indian country, 
when in fact the question had never been judicially addressed.223  
In January 2015, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in 
Kelsey v. Pope224 reversed the Michigan district court’s holding that tribes cannot 
exercise extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction.225  Whereas the district court in-
terpreted the absence of evidence or confirmation regarding tribes’ exercise of 
extraterritorial jurisdiction as indicating that such jurisdiction did not exist,226 
the Sixth Circuit approached the question as one about the scope of retained 
sovereign rights.227  Following the inside out approach advocated by the Little 
River Band, the court devoted several pages of its opinion to discussing whether 
membership-based criminal jurisdiction was an aspect of tribes’ inherent sover-
eignty.228  In determining that it was, the court relied primarily on the language of 
Wheeler and Duro, acknowledging that those cases involved on-reservation crimes 
but refusing to read in a territorial limitation just because the Supreme Court had 
  
220. The magistrate in Kelsey adopted this view despite the fact that it “[could not] find any federal 
limitation over the exercise of tribal criminal authority over crimes committed by Indians on land 
which is owned in fee by the Tribe.”  2014 WL 1338170, at *8. 
221. Id. at *14.  The Fife court did not even acknowledge Settler. 
222. For the most recent example, see INDIAN LAW AND ORDER COMM’N, supra note 8, at 23 
(proposing that federal law be amended to permit tribes to opt out of federal criminal jurisdiction 
and have their full territorial jurisdiction restored). 
223. The courts in Fife and Kelsey seized on several such statements as evidence of widespread 
agreement that tribes lack extraterritorial jurisdiction.  See supra notes 215, 219. 
224. 809 F.3d 849 (6th Cir. 2016). 
225. Id. at 863. 
226. See Kelsey v. Pope, No. 1:09-CV-1015, 2014 WL 1338170, at *3 (W.D. Mich. Mar. 31, 2014), 
rev’d and vacated, 809 F.3d 849 (6th Cir. 2016). 
227. See Kelsey, 809 F.3d at 855 (beginning jurisdictional analysis with a discussion of inherent tribal 
sovereignty). 
228. Id. at 855–59. 
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only encountered tribal prosecutions of on-reservation crimes.229  The court also 
rejected the district court’s analysis in Fife v. Moore, which it viewed as having 
“place[d] too great an emphasis” on the fact that the crime in Wheeler occurred on 
the reservation.230  In effect, the Sixth Circuit chided the Fife court for its outside 
in approach, which considered only what tribes had done in most cases and too 
easily dismissed any potential for more expansive jurisdiction.  Finally, the Court 
held that Congress had not expressly limited tribes’ membership-based criminal 
jurisdiction, and it refused to hold that the power had been implicitly divested.231  
It is too soon to tell whether the Sixth Circuit decision will stand, although 
Kelsey’s request for rehearing was denied.232  The opinion, however, is remarka-
ble for its careful inside out analysis of criminal jurisdiction as an aspect of inher-
ent tribal sovereignty.  It relies almost exclusively on authority that speaks directly 
to the scope of tribal criminal jurisdiction.  Like the Wetsit opinion, it does not 
include a discussion of the jurisdictional web governing Little River Band terri-
tory, nor does it describe membership-based criminal jurisdiction as something 
tribes need because no other government could have prosecuted Kelsey.  In fact, 
the court devoted less than one page of its opinion to a discussion of federal 
criminal statutes, and it reviewed them only to determine whether they should 
be interpreted as divesting tribes of their membership-based criminal powers.233  
Moreover, the court did not narrow its holding to the unique circumstances of 
Kelsey’s crime, which involved a tribal government official in the course of tribal 
business and occurred on tribally owned fee land adjacent to a reservation.  The 
court adhered to “the baseline assumption that, ‘until Congress acts, tribes retain 
their historic sovereign authority’” and held that tribes retain broad criminal 
jurisdiction over their members, including the power to prosecute them for 
extraterritorial crimes.234  
Kelsey also contains a cautionary tale about the danger of untested assump-
tions: Arguing against tribal jurisdiction, the defendant pointed to a state-
ment in the 1942 version of Felix Cohen’s Handbook of Federal Indian Law 
that described tribal criminal jurisdiction as applying only within Indian 
  
229. Id. at 859. 
230. Id.  
231. Id. at 859–63. 
232. Order Denying Reh’g, Kelsey, 809 F.3d at 855 (Feb. 8, 2016) (on file with author); see also Pet. for 
Cert., Kelsey v. Bailey, No. 16-5120 (filed July 7, 2016) (on file with author).  
233. Kelsey, 809 F.3d at 862. 
234. The Kelsey court did note that “certain applications of extra-territorial criminal jurisdiction might 
well be incompatible with the tribes’ status as dependent sovereigns—that is, where they 
tangentially impact tribal self-governance or fail to implicate core internal relations,” but it held that 
Kelsey’s conduct clearly did affect tribal self-governance and declined to narrow its holding to 
encompass only the specific circumstances presented in the case.  Id. 
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country.235  Territory and criminal jurisdiction are often tied together, and most 
tribal prosecutions do involve crimes committed within Indian country, but that 
statement was not the product of considered reflection on the question of 
extraterritorial power.236  Had the court not rejected Kelsey’s attempt to invoke 
“hornbook” law, however, a single statement in a treatise could have further lim-
ited tribes’ criminal power more than seventy years later. 
V. JUVENILE DELINQUENCY JURISDICTION 
Another grey area concerns the scope of juvenile delinquency jurisdiction, 
which many tribes exercise but which neither Congress nor the federal courts 
have carefully considered.  The outside in approach to criminal justice in Indian 
country is compounded in this area by a general lack of attention to delinquency 
among Indian law scholars.  Even the few articles and reports focused specifically 
on juvenile justice tend to treat it as a subset of criminal jurisdiction, assuming 
that the same rules, criticisms, and solutions apply.237  Partly as a consequence of 
this inattention, tribal juvenile justice systems have developed in response to non-
tribal priorities instead of being driven by tribal priorities.238 
Juvenile justice is a unique area, however, with specific laws that govern its 
jurisdictional web.  The Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act (FJDA) establishes 
federal jurisdiction over acts of juvenile delinquency and sets forth the procedures 
for prosecuting any juvenile “alleged to have committed a[]” “violation of a law of 
the United States . . . prior to his eighteenth birthday which would have been a 
crime if committed by an adult.”239  Without the FJDA, the federal courts would 
  
235. Id. at 859 n.6. 
236. As the Sixth Circuit noted, the 1942 Handbook relied only on an 1886 administrative opinion.  Id.  
The 2012 Handbook (of which Professor Goldberg was an editor) includes more in-depth consid-
eration of non-territorial jurisdiction, see supra note 219, and “points to the opposite conclusion.”  
Kelsey, 809 F.3d at 859 n.6; see also Brief of Appellant at 31–32, Kelsey, 809 F.3d 849 (2016) (No. 
14-1537). 
237. E.g., ATTORNEY GENERAL’S ADV. COMM. ON AMERICAN INDIAN AND ALASKA NATIVE 
CHILDREN EXPOSED TO VIOLENCE, ENDING VIOLENCE SO CHILDREN CAN THRIVE 112 
(2014); INDIAN LAW AND ORDER COMM’N, supra note 8, at 155; Ryan Seelau, The Kids Aren’t 
Alright: An Argument to Use the Nation- Building Model in the Development of Native Juvenile Justice 
Systems to Combat the Effects of Failed Assimilative Policies, 17 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 97, 106 
(2012). 
238. Rolnick, supra note 4, at 182.  The analysis described in this section originally appeared in Addie 
C. Rolnick, Untangling the Web: Juvenile Justice in Indian Country, 19 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. 
POL’Y 49 (2016). 
239. 18 U.S.C. § 5032 (2012) (referring to any “juvenile alleged to have committed an act of juvenile 
delinquency”); 18 U.S.C. § 5031 (2012) (defining “juvenile delinquency” as “violation of a law of 
the United States committed by a person prior to his eighteenth birthday which would have been a 
crime if committed by an adult”). 
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have no juvenile delinquency jurisdiction and could try juveniles only if they were 
charged with adult crimes in district court.  The FJDA does not create any sepa-
rate substantive offenses, so in order for a juvenile to be prosecuted under it, the 
juvenile must have committed an offense defined elsewhere by federal criminal 
law.240  If an Indian juvenile commits any offense defined by federal law, includ-
ing Indian country offenses, the FJDA applies.241 
The FJDA embodies an outside in approach to juvenile justice in that it 
largely ignores the existence of tribal juvenile jurisdiction.  The statute aims to 
keep juveniles out of federal court, so it strongly defers to state jurisdiction: A 
prosecutor may not proceed against a juvenile in federal court until the Attorney 
General certifies that the state lacks or is unwilling to take jurisdiction over the 
case, the state does not have adequate programs or services for the juvenile in 
question, the juvenile has committed a serious violent offense or a drug offense, or 
there is a substantial federal interest involved.242  Yet, it does not require the 
Attorney General to similarly defer to tribal prosecution.243  Instead, the certi-
fication requirement is met in Indian country cases by a certification that the state 
lacks jurisdiction over Indian country.244  By failing to acknowledge tribal juvenile 
courts and focusing only on the relationship between federal and state courts, the 
law leaves room for duplicative federal prosecutions that can undermine the 
efforts of tribal juvenile courts.245 
Recent critiques of juvenile justice in Indian country similarly begin with a 
focus on federal and state systems, emphasizing the harm done to Native youth 
  
240. See § 5032. 
241. See United States v. Male Juvenile, 280 F.3d 1008, 1017–19 (9th Cir. 2002) (maintaining that a 
violation of § 1153 constitutes “violation of a law of the United States,” even if the enumerated 
crime is defined by reference to state criminal law); United States v. Allen, 574 F.2d 435, 437–38 
(8th Cir. 1978). 
242. § 5032.  There is an exception for offenses that carry a maximum term of six months or fewer when 
committed with the special maritime or territorial jurisdiction of the United States.  See Rolnick, 
supra note 4, at 124 (explaining that the FJDA continued a longstanding preference for keeping 
juveniles out of the federal system whenever possible). 
243. See Male Juvenile, 280 F.3d at 1014–17; United States v. Juvenile Male, 864 F.2d 641, 644–46 (9th 
Cir. 1988); Allen, 574 F.2d at 438–39; Rolnick, supra note 4, at 104 n.253, 126; see also Amy J. 
Standefer, Note, The Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act: A Disparate Impact on Native American 
Juveniles, 84 MINN. L. REV. 473, 483–85 (1999) (“[D]espite Congress’s desire to keep juveniles in 
the state or local system, the federal government may assume jurisdiction over Indian juveniles 
charged with serious offenses without obtaining tribal consent.”).  Post-1990 amendments to the 
FJDA at least acknowledge tribal sovereignty by preventing certain adult transfer provisions from 
applying to Indian country juveniles absent tribal consent, see Rolnick, supra note 4, at 104–05, but 
the law still fails to acknowledge the role of tribal juvenile courts. 
244. See Allen, 574 F.2d at 438–39. 
245. See Rolnick, supra note 4, at 104 n.251 (citing cases in which federal courts sentenced juveniles to 
incarceration terms after a tribal court had already ordered probation and treatment). 
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by those systems.246  This harm is real.  Youth prosecuted in the federal system 
spend more time locked up than their counterparts in state systems, because fed-
eral sentences are longer and the federal system does not include diversion, 
parole, and other alternatives.247  Because the federal government does not run 
any juvenile facilities, Native youth are placed in state or local facilities under 
contract agreements, often far from home.248  Where states have Indian country 
jurisdiction, Native youth end up submerged in state juvenile justice systems, 
where they are often treated more harshly, but are rarely provided programs or 
support tailored to their unique needs.249  Moving toward an approach that cen-
ters tribal courts, recent critiques seek to strengthen and expand tribal juvenile 
justice systems and correspondingly narrow the role of non-tribal governments in 
Indian country.250 
Yet, even while strengthened tribal jurisdiction is offered as a promising so-
lution to the juvenile justice crisis, the tendency toward an outside in analysis has 
resulted in little sustained attention to the jurisdictional boundaries of tribal juve-
nile courts and the unique opportunities and obstacles they face.251  Failure to 
acknowledge tribal governments as the primary drivers of Indian country juvenile 
justice has had serious consequences.  For example, in a recent analysis of federal 
funding and juvenile incarceration trends in Indian country from 1998 to 2013, I 
found that tribes operating their own juvenile justice systems are in many cases 
mirroring the dominant approach of federal and state governments by investing 
in juvenile prison construction and incarcerating juvenile offenders for relatively 
  
246. See ATTORNEY GENERAL’S ADV. COMM., supra note 237, at 120; INDIAN LAW & ORDER 
COMM’N, supra note 8, at 166–67. 
247. See ATTORNEY GENERAL’S ADV. COMM., supra note 237, at 120; INDIAN LAW & ORDER 
COMM’N, supra note 8, at 155, 160; NEELUM ARYA & ADDIE C. ROLNICK, A TANGLED WEB 
OF JUSTICE: AMERICAN INDIAN AND ALASKA NATIVE YOUTH IN FEDERAL, STATE, AND 
TRIBAL JUSTICE SYSTEMS, 24–26 (2009). 
248. See ATTORNEY GENERAL’S ADV. COMM., supra note 237, at 120; INDIAN LAW & ORDER 
COMM’N, supra note 8, at 155, 160. 
249. See INDIAN LAW & ORDER COMM’N, supra note 8, at 157; ARYA & ROLNICK, supra note 247, 
at 20–24; see also ATTORNEY GENERAL’S ADV. COMM., supra note 237, at 116 (“Programming 
offered in state juvenile justice systems is not meeting the needs of AI/AN youth and in some cases 
is harming these youth.”). 
250. See ATTORNEY GENERAL’S ADV. COMM., supra note 237, at 111 (criticizing the “complex 
jurisdictional system” and describing a vision for a “more effective, tribally driven juvenile justice 
system”); INDIAN LAW & ORDER COMM’N, supra note 8, at 159 (recommending removing 
Native children from federal and state jurisdiction whenever possible with the goal of “releasing 
Tribes from dysfunctional Federal and State controls and empowering them to provide locally 
accountable, culturally informed self-government”). 
251. See Rolnick, supra note 4, at 113–14 (explaining that tribal juvenile jurisdiction is treated as an 
“afterthought”). 
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minor offenses.252  One explanation for this is that tribes have been following 
the money as they strengthen their juvenile systems.  Federal funding for facili-
ty construction, facility operation, and delinquency programming strongly fa-
vored incarceration—as opposed to treatment, restorative justice, or alternative 
programs—during this time period.253  Tribal justice systems have been planned 
and built in response to the models and financial priorities of other governments, 
rather than according to the tribe’s needs and philosophies.254  To a large extent, 
they have been built from the outside in to fill gaps left by, and to adopt the struc-
tures of, other governments. 
A truly inside out approach to Indian country juvenile justice would not 
begin by mirroring federal and state systems.  It would begin by examining both 
the potential scope of tribal juvenile jurisdiction and the range of choices available 
to tribes in determining how to implement that power, with federal and state ju-
risdiction significant only to the degree they can support tribal choices.  A simple 
way to implement this approach would be amend the Federal Juvenile Delin-
quency Act to require federal courts to defer to tribal prosecution in the same way 
they defer to state prosecution.255  
A more significant intervention would be to avoid the assumption that ju-
venile delinquency jurisdiction is just like adult criminal jurisdiction, or that it is 
criminal at all.  While juvenile delinquency jurisdiction is often assumed to be a 
subcategory of criminal jurisdiction,256 criminal and juvenile jurisdiction are not 
necessarily identical, and the differences have important implications.  Juvenile 
delinquency jurisdiction—disciplining, controlling, teaching, and caring for 
children—is a key aspect of tribes’ inherent authority,257 so tribes today retain 
their jurisdiction to address juvenile delinquency except to the extent that it has 
  
252. See Addie C. Rolnick, Locked Up: Fear, Racism, Prison Economics and the Incarceration of Native 
Youth, 40 AM. INDIAN CULTURE & RES. J. 55, 61–67 (2016). 
253. Id. at 66. 
254. Rolnick, supra note 4, at 114–17.  Of course, even in the absence of outside pressure, some tribes 
might choose to incarcerate juveniles for relatively minor offenses.  As sovereigns, they are free to 
make such a judgment and to engage and respond to criticisms that their people may have of that 
policy choice.  See id. at 71 (“[E]ven if tribal policy choices seem unwise, they embody legitimacy 
and reflect . . . community values in a way that outsider-imposed policy choices never can.”). 
255. See Rolnick, supra note 4, at 132–33 (proposing such an amendment). 
256. See Rolnick, supra note 4, at 88 n.173 (describing commentators’ tendency to view juvenile 
jurisdiction as a species of criminal jurisdiction). 
257. See Elizabeth S. Scott, The Legal Construction of Childhood, in A CENTURY OF JUVENILE JUSTICE 
113, 116 (Margaret K. Rosenheim et al. eds., 2002) (describing the parens patriae power of the 
state over children as the source of American state authority over juvenile delinquency); see also 
Preface to A CENTURY OF JUVENILE JUSTICE, at xiii (Margaret K. Rosenheim et al. eds., 2002) 
(contending that the juvenile court “plays an important role in the governments of most developed 
nations”). 
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been limited or divested by federal law.  Whether juvenile jurisdiction has been 
limited and to what extent is complicated by the fact that the scope of modern 
tribal criminal jurisdiction is different from the scope of modern tribal civil juris-
diction, and juvenile jurisdiction falls in a grey area between criminal and civil 
regulatory jurisdiction.  
If a tribe retains the power to criminally punish adults, a power that is 
broader than many assume, it also retains the power to adjudicate juvenile delin-
quents absent some express language to the contrary.  As described in Part III, 
tribes have criminal jurisdiction over tribal members258 and “nonmember Indi-
ans,”259 and the latter category likely includes unenrolled community members 
as well as anyone enrolled in another federally recognized tribe.260  Tribes thus 
have jurisdiction over juvenile offenders who are tribal citizens as well as those 
who might otherwise qualify as Indians.261  Their jurisdiction may reach beyond 
reservation borders in certain cases, as described in Part IV.262  If a tribe chooses 
to approach juvenile delinquency as a species of child welfare (instead of as a spe-
cies of criminal law), the scope of that jurisdiction may be even less constrained.  
Because of the differences between juvenile courts and criminal courts, the 
limits that federal law clearly imposes on tribal criminal jurisdiction are less sig-
nificant in juvenile cases than in adult cases.  The Indian Civil Rights Act 
(ICRA) requires tribal courts to comply with most of the same basic due process 
requirements applicable to federal and state courts.263  If a juvenile defendant in 
tribal court faces adversarial proceedings and a potential deprivation of liberty on 
par with that faced by an adult criminal, as juveniles do in non-tribal systems, the 
tribe must guarantee most of the same rights that are required in its criminal 
court.  In the context of state juvenile courts, the Supreme Court has held that 
nearly all of the procedural rights guaranteed to adults are also required in juvenile 
  
258. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 322 (1978); Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, 380 (1896). 
259. See supra note 113. 
260. Rolnick, supra note 114, at 390–429.   
261. See Las Vegas Tribe of Paiute Indians v. Phebus, 5 F. Supp. 3d 1221, 1229–31 (D. Nev. 2014).  See 
generally Rolnick, supra note 114, at 370–86 (establishing that tribes have criminal jurisdiction over 
people who are not tribal citizens and describing alternative tests for Indianness).   
262. See supra Part IV.  
263. The Bill of Rights does not apply to tribal governments.  See Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 329; Talton, 163 
U.S. at 384.  But the Indian Civil Rights Act, a federal law passed in 1968, requires tribal courts to 
comply with most of the limitations applicable to federal and state courts.  Pub. L. No. 90-284, tit. 
II, § 202, 82 Stat. 77 (1968) (codified as 25 U.S.C. § 1302(a)).  The law was directed primarily at 
concerns about potential unfairness to Native defendants in tribal criminal proceedings.  Although 
it applies to all actions by tribal governments, it is most important as a limitation in criminal cases, 
where it can be enforced through a habeas corpus petition brought in federal court by any tribal 
defendant.  See 25 U.S.C. § 1303 (2012). 
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proceedings, including the right to notice of charges,264 the privilege against self-
incrimination,265 the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses,266 the right 
to proof beyond a reasonable doubt,267 and the protection against double 
jeopardy.268 
For sentences of one year or less, tribes are not required to provide indigent 
defendants with free attorneys.269  In addition, neither states nor the federal gov-
ernment are required to guarantee the right to a jury trial in juvenile proceed-
ings.270  Thus, while ICRA guarantees the right to a jury trial for any offense that 
could result in imprisonment,271 it can be argued that this right does not extend to 
tribal juvenile proceedings because the Sixth Amendment, after which the ICRA 
jury trial requirement was modeled, has not been interpreted to cover state juve-
nile proceedings.272  Juveniles appearing before tribal courts, then, have all the 
rights enjoyed by adults in state criminal systems except that they do not 
have a right to free legal counsel and may not have a right to a jury trial. 
The ICRA also restricts sentence length.273  The effect of the sentence limi-
tation on juvenile adjudications is not entirely clear, however, as juveniles are not 
  
264. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 33–34 (1967). 
265. Id. at 47. 
266. Id. at 56. 
267. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 368 (1970). 
268. Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 541 (1975). 
269. See 25 U.S.C. § 1302(a)(6) (2012). 
270. See McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 547 (1971) (“The imposition of the jury trial on the 
juvenile court system would not strengthen greatly, if at all, the factfinding function, and would, 
contrarily, provide an attrition of the juvenile court’s assumed ability to function in a unique 
manner.”). 
271. See § 1302(a)(10) (2012) (stating that tribes may not “deny to any person accused of an offense 
punishable by imprisonment the right, upon request, to a trial by jury of not less than six persons”). 
272.  The effect of McKeiver on tribal juvenile proceedings has never been addressed by a federal court. 
273. Tribes in most cases may not sentence offenders to more than one year of imprisonment or impose 
a fine of more than $5000.  25 U.S.C. § 1302(a)(7)(B) (2012).  However, tribes may elect to 
sentence offenders to up to three years imprisonment and impose fines of up to $15,000 per 
offense.  See 25 U.S.C. § 1302(b) (2012).  In order to be eligible for a sentence of more than one 
year, the defendant must have been convicted of a crime that would subject him to more than 
one year of incarceration in state court (§ 1302(b)(2)), or must have a prior conviction for the 
same or a comparable offense in any court (§ 1302(b)(1)).  This change was implemented by the 
Tribal Law and Order Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-211, tit. II, § 234(a), 124 Stat. 2279 
(2010).  Tribal courts may also stack sentences for multiple offenses for a total of up to nine 
years’ imprisonment.  See 25 U.S.C. § 1302(a)(7)(D) (2012).  This provision codified a Ninth 
Circuit case upholding the Pascua Yaqui Tribe’s practice of sentence stacking.  See Miranda v. 
Anchondo, 654 F.3d 911 (9th Cir. 2011).  In order to impose total sentence of more than one year, 
tribes must ensure that their laws and procedures mirror non-tribal systems even more closely.  
Specifically, they must provide free public defenders, ensure that judges are law-trained and 
certified, make criminal laws publicly available, and maintain a record of the proceeding, including 
an audio recording of the trial.  25 U.S.C. § 1302(c) (2012).  The Supreme Court in Gault declined 
to require state juvenile courts to keep a trial transcript of confidential juvenile proceedings or to 
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always sentenced to a term of years.  Instead, some juvenile courts employ inde-
terminate sentencing in which a juvenile may be sentenced to a broad range of 
years or is placed under juvenile court jurisdiction for the duration of his or her 
minority.274  Where a young offender in tribal court faces potential incarceration 
of up to one year for a single offense, either because tribal law specifies a term of 
one year or because the juvenile will age out of juvenile court jurisdiction within a 
year, there is no question that the sentence would comply with the ICRA.  
Where a juvenile faces a determinate sentence of greater than one year or 
where he or she was remanded to tribal custody for an indeterminate period 
(and will not age out of juvenile court jurisdiction for many years), however, the 
ICRA may require that tribal courts specify an outside limit on any term of incar-
ceration in a way that a state court would not be required to do.275  Of course, a 
tribe that has opted into the enhanced sentencing provisions would have more 
flexibility to retain jurisdiction over a juvenile who has been adjudicated delin-
quent without running afoul of federal law. 
American juvenile courts have their roots in the idea that children are less 
culpable and more open to reform, and therefore require a system focused on 
rehabilitation and treatment, rather than retribution and punishment.276  Juve-
nile justice policy has at times favored a more criminal approach,277 but the past 
two decades have seen courts and legislatures reemphasize the idea that children 
  
hold that juveniles have a right to appeal, because the Court had not held that the Constitution 
guaranteed to even adult criminal defendants a right to appellate review.  In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 58 
(1967).  Thus, although the ICRA requires a trial recording when defendants face more than a year 
of incarceration, this requirement may not apply to juvenile proceedings, even where the juvenile 
faces more than a year of incarceration. 
274. In early juvenile courts, “[d]ispositions were indeterminate, nonproportional, and continued for the 
duration of the child’s minority.  The delicts that brought the child before the court affected neither 
the intensity nor the duration of intervention because each child’s ‘real needs’ differed, and no limits 
could be defined in advance.”  Barry C. Feld, The Juvenile Court Meets the Principle of the Offense: 
Legislative Changes in Juvenile Waiver Statutes, 78 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 471, 477 (1987); 
see also Barry C. Feld, The Juvenile Court Meets the Principle of Offense: Punishment, Treatment, and 
the Difference It Makes, 68 B.U. L. REV. 821, 825, 848–50 (1988) [hereinafter Feld, Punishment, 
Treatment, and the Difference It Makes] (describing the role of indeterminate sentencing in the early 
juvenile court and the structure of indeterminate and/or flexible sentencing laws across states).  But 
see Barry C. Feld, Abolish the Juvenile Court: Youthfulness, Criminal Responsibility, and Sentencing 
Policy, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 68, 83 (1997) (finding that nearly half of all states had 
adopted determinate or mandatory minimum sentencing laws a decade later); Feld, Punishment, 
Treatment, and the Difference It Makes, supra, at 851–62 (noting a growing trend among states 
toward determinate sentencing laws in juvenile court).  
275. This could be done by using determinate sentencing or by using indeterminate juvenile court 
jurisdiction with the qualification that the juvenile court may not include in its disposition more 
than one year of confinement in a locked facility.   
276. Rolnick, supra note 4, at 72–73. 
277. Id. at 74–75. 
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are different, relying on research on adolescent brains to conclude that children 
are less culpable and more amenable to rehabilitation and treatment.278  While ju-
venile courts today share many similarities with criminal courts,279 the historical 
development of state juvenile courts and current thinking regarding adoles-
cent development at least raise questions about whether juvenile delinquency 
jurisdiction is appropriately categorized as criminal or civil regulatory juris-
diction.  Outside of the tribal context, this is more a policy debate than a legal 
one.  Juveniles are entitled to most of the same due process protections during 
their adjudication as adults are, and all that remains is how best to address their 
offenses.  For tribes, though, this question is much more significant because civil 
regulatory jurisdiction is not limited by the same statutes and cases limiting tribes’ 
exercise of criminal jurisdiction. 
The question whether a tribe’s exercise of juvenile delinquency jurisdiction 
will be considered criminal or civil hinges mainly on how the tribe conceives of 
and exercises its power over children.  Delinquency is in many ways an extension 
of child welfare: Many of the same children who are involved in the child welfare 
system end up in the delinquency system,280 and research indicates that harm suf-
fered by children is a significant risk factor for later delinquency.281  A tribe could 
choose to treat its young people as children in need of care by placing young 
offenders in rehabilitative, educational, or treatment programs and by elimi-
nating or significantly reducing the criminal aspects of delinquency adjudica-
tions (for example, incarceration or other deprivation of liberty, use of juvenile 
records to enhance adult sentences, and collateral consequences involving the loss 
of rights such as voting, child custody, or access to housing).  The precise charac-
ter, and therefore scope, of tribal juvenile jurisdiction would be determined by a 
tribe’s choices about how to address delinquency.  These choices would in turn be 
guided by the tribe’s philosophies of child-rearing and discipline and by the needs 
of youth and community members.  A system like this is more likely to be viewed 
  
278. Id. at 75–76. 
279. See Barry C. Feld, Criminalizing of the American Juvenile Court, in READINGS IN JUVENILE 
JUSTICE ADMINISTRATION, supra, at 356, 359–66; Gary B. Melton, Taking Gault Seriously: 
Toward a New Juvenile Court, in READINGS IN JUVENILE JUSTICE ADMINISTRATION 343, 351–
54 (Barry C. Feld ed., 1999). 
280. CTR. FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE REFORM, ADDRESSING THE NEEDS OF MULTI SYSTEM 
YOUTH: STRENGTHENING THE CONNECTION BETWEEN CHILD WELFARE AND JUVENILE 
JUSTICE 1 (2012) (“[C]hildren involved in the child welfare system are at risk of ‘crossing over’ to 
the juvenile justice system and . . . many juvenile justice–involved youth later become involved in 
the child welfare system.”). 
281. See Mary C. Marsiglio et al., Examining the Link Between Traumatic Events and Delinquency Among 
Juvenile Delinquent Girls: A Longitudinal Study, 7 J. CHILD & ADOLESCENT TRAUMA 217, 217–
19 (describing social science research on the connection between trauma and delinquency). 
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as an exercise of a tribe’s power to care for its children.  That power is an exercise 
of civil jurisdiction, and it is not governed by the same rules that govern tribal 
criminal power. 
If all, or most, of a tribe’s exercise of juvenile jurisdiction can be catego-
rized as civil regulatory jurisdiction, a tribe may retain jurisdiction over juve-
nile justice even if it lacks such jurisdiction over adult criminals.  The limits 
described above would not apply.282  Sentence length is not a limitation in a sys-
tem that does not involve incarceration or a similar deprivation of liberty.  Indian 
status may matter, but there is no categorical rule against a tribe’s exercise of 
power over non-Indians within their territory.283  Territorial limits would not 
apply.  Indeed, courts have specifically recognized that tribes retain civil juris-
diction over certain matters involving their members, including domestic rela-
tions and child custody, even outside Indian country.284  Moreover, Congress has 
specifically confirmed tribes’ extraterritorial power over their children in child 
welfare matters.285  In addition, because the Supreme Court has held that Public 
Law 280 did not transfer civil regulatory jurisdiction to states,286 those states sub-
ject to the law would not be able to regulate delinquency matters unless delin-
quency was an area over which the state specifically assumed jurisdiction.287 
It is not entirely clear how a court would view a tribe’s argument that delin-
quency jurisdiction is noncriminal.  Although the juvenile justice system is nomi-
nally distinct from the criminal justice system under federal and state laws, most 
juvenile courts today operate very much like criminal courts, and most of the 
youth adjudicated in juvenile court have the same procedural protections as 
adults in criminal court.  If presented with the question, a federal court might 
  
282.  See supra notes 263–275 and accompanying text. 
283. The rule in the civil context, even when stated in its broadest form, is that tribes may regulate and 
adjudicate civil matters involving non-Indians (and nonmember Indians) as long as the 
nonmember entered into a consensual relationship with the tribe or its members, or his or her 
actions have a direct effect on the health, welfare, political integrity, or economic security of the 
tribe or its members.  See Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land & Cattle Co., 554 U.S. 
316, 328–30 (2008); Nevada v. Hicks, 553 U.S. 353, 359 (2001); Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley, 
532 U.S. 645, 647 (2001); Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 445 (1997); Montana v. 
United States, 450 U.S. 544, 566 (1981).  While it is not easy to meet these criteria, a non-Indian 
juvenile’s commission of an offense on tribally owned land that would be a crime if committed by 
an adult, particularly if the victim is a member of the tribe, is something that the tribe could 
potentially regulate under this standard.   
284. See, e.g., John v. Baker, 982 P.2d 738 (Alaska 1999) (holding that tribes retain membership-based, 
as opposed to territory-based, jurisdiction over child custody disputes). 
285. See 25 U.S.C. § 1911 (2012). 
286. See Bryan v. Itasca Cty., 426 U.S. 373 (1976). 
287. For example, Washington’s law accepting Indian country jurisdiction specifically includes an 
acceptance of juvenile delinquency jurisdiction.  RCW § 37.12.010. 
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determine, for example, that tribal juvenile proceedings are subject to exactly the 
same procedural and jurisdictional limitations as tribal criminal proceedings.  No 
federal court has fully considered the scope of modern tribal juvenile jurisdic-
tion, however, in part because tribal juvenile courts tend to resemble criminal 
courts, especially in that they employ incarceration.  If a tribe were to choose not 
to incarcerate juveniles, it could more persuasively argue that its delinquency ju-
risdiction were civil.   
Whether all delinquency matters can be characterized as civil jurisdiction 
remains an unanswered question, but there is one area of delinquency jurisdic-
tion that is clearly noncriminal—status offenses.  Status offenses are acts for 
which youth may be found delinquent but which would not be illegal if they were 
committed by adults.288  These include: running away, some offenses involving 
sexual activity by a minor, possession or consumption of alcohol by a minor, and 
catchall offenses like incorrigibility or child in need of supervision.289  Federal law 
prohibits locking up youth for these offenses, and they are generally treated today 
as noncriminal matters.290  A tribe’s adjudication of status offenses should clearly 
be governed by the rules concerning civil regulatory jurisdiction, not criminal 
power. 
An inside out approach, which asks why tribes need to exercise delinquency 
jurisdiction and what they seek to achieve with its exercise, could have important 
consequences for funding and policy as well.  If tribes are free to determine the 
purpose, scope, and substance of their own juvenile delinquency systems, 
they might choose to design systems that look very different from their state 
counterparts.  Only by carefully designing their own systems can tribes ensure 
that they will not inadvertently reproduce an outside model that prioritizes incar-
ceration.  Congress and federal agencies could redirect funding to support the 
specific needs of tribal juvenile systems, prioritizing alternative approaches and 
reducing overreliance on incarceration. 
  
288. See COAL. FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE & TRIBAL LAW & POLICY INST., AMERICAN 
INDIAN/ALASKA NATIVE YOUTH & STATUS OFFENSE DISPARITIES: A CALL FOR TRIBAL 
INITIATIVES, COORDINATION & FEDERAL FUNDING 1 (2015). 
289. See Thalia González, Reclaiming the Promise of the Indian Child Welfare Act: A Study of State 
Incorporation and Adoption of Legal Protections for Indian Status Offenders, 42 N.M. L. REV. 131, 
132 n.7 (2012). 
290. See 42 U.S.C. § 5633(a)(13) (2012) (conditioning federal juvenile justice assistance on a state’s 
agreement not to incarcerate status offenders). 
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CONCLUSION 
Tribal courts hear criminal and juvenile cases involving a range of offenses.  
Russell Means assaulted his father-in-law.291  Billy Jo Lara resisted a police officer 
who was trying to remove him from the reservation after he violated an exclusion 
order that was issued after he was arrested for public intoxication.292  Norbert 
Kelsey, a tribal government official, sexually harassed a tribal employee.293  Ann 
Walker killed two people in a car accident.294  Georgia Leigh Westsit stabbed her 
husband.295  Christopher Phebus threatened to throw a rock through the window 
of the police chief’s office.296  The defendants’ stories and the circumstances of 
their crimes defy easy categorization.  Russell Means and Billy Jo Lara, longtime 
members of their respective tribal communities via marriage, residence, and 
community involvement, were not citizens of the prosecuting tribes.297  Norbert 
Kelsey, in his capacity as a government official, was attending a tribal function 
that happened to be located outside of Indian country.298  Ann Walker lived on 
the Omaha Reservation in Nebraska, where the state had jurisdiction over her 
crime.299  Georgia Leigh Westsit had already been acquitted by a federal court of 
her crime.300  Christopher Phebus lived in the community from which he was de-
scended and where he was formerly recognized as a citizen, but he was no longer 
considered a citizen of his tribe because of a change in tribal law.301  In the grey 
areas in which the scope of their criminal jurisdiction is still an open legal ques-
tion, it is important for tribes not to prematurely assume that federal law limits 
their power over a diverse cast of defendants and a full range of crimes that may 
occur in complex circumstances.  Avoiding these assumptions requires that each 
new question be addressed using an inside out analysis, which focuses on why 
tribes need jurisdiction over a particular person or offense and how they have cho-
sen to exercise that jurisdiction, rather than envisioning tribal courts as simply 
mimicking state and federal courts in order to fill in jurisdictional gaps.  
Centering tribes also directs the conversation toward tribal law and poli-
cy.  It invites tribes to explore the full range of possible approaches to criminal and 
  
291. Means v. Navajo Nation, 432 F.3d 924, 927 (9th Cir. 2005); see supra note 155. 
292. United States v. Lara, 324 F.3d 635, 636 (8th Cir. 2003). 
293. Kelsey v. Pope, 809 F.3d 849, 861–62, 866 (6th Cir. 2016); see supra note 217. 
294. Walker v. Rushing, 898 F.2d 672, 673 (8th Cir. 1990). 
295.  See supra note 59. 
296.  Las Vegas Paiute Tribe of Indians v. Phebus, 5 F. Supp. 3d 1221, 1226 (D. Nev. 2014). 
297. See supra notes 148 and 154. 
298. Kelsey, 809 F.3d at 853–54; see supra note 217. 
299.  See supra notes 95–96. 
300.  See supra note 60. 
301. Phebus, 5 F. Supp. 3d at 1225; see supra notes 168–170. 
1690 63 UCLA L. REV. 1638 (2016) 
 
juvenile justice.  In the juvenile context, for example, an inside out approach can 
enable tribes to build and reform their juvenile systems in keeping with tribal pri-
orities, including reducing or eliminating incarceration.  Furthermore, if imposed 
federal laws do little to limit tribal criminal and juvenile jurisdiction, tribal law 
and policy becomes more important as the primary source of jurisdictional limits.  
The most recent example of this phenomenon involves public defenders in tribal 
courts.  Federal law does not require tribes to provide free counsel to indigent In-
dian defendants who face a term of incarceration of one year or less.302  Congress 
and the Court have declined to change this law.303  The absence of a federal limit 
has had the effect of centering tribes because tribal law is now the only possible 
source of a public defender requirement.  Some tribes guarantee a right to counsel 
as a matter of tribal law,304 and Indian law scholars increasingly urge tribes to do 
so.305  Access to defense counsel continues to be a concern for tribes, advocates, 
and scholars, but it is being addressed through changes to tribal law, rather than 
through federal restrictions on tribal jurisdiction.  This is how it ought to be.  
Tribes retain a great deal of their inherent criminal and juvenile jurisdiction.  
Without federally imposed limitations, tribal law and policy, including decisions 
about how to ensure fairness and effectively address crime, how best to allocate 
tribal resources, and whether to invite review of undecided federal legal issues, are 
the main factors in determining how far a specific tribe wishes to extend the reach 
of its laws. 
 
  
302. 25 U.S.C. § 1302(a)(6) (2012). 
303.  The Supreme Court reaffirmed it in 2016 when it held that the use of uncounseled tribal court 
convictions to enhance a federal sentence, a practice specifically authorized by a 2013 law making 
repeated domestic assault a federal felony, Violence Against Women and Department of Justice 
Reauthorization Act of 2005 (VAWA Reauthorization Act), Pub. L. 109–162, §§901, 909, 119 
Stat. 3077, 3084 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 117(a)), is consistent with the Fifth and Sixth 
Amendments.  United States v. Bryant, No. 15-420, slip op. at 16 (June 13, 2016) (“Proceedings in 
compliance with ICRA, Congress determined, and we agree, sufficiently ensure the reliability of 
tribal-court convictions.  Therefore, the use of those convictions in a federal prosecution does not 
violate a defendant’s right to due process.”). 
304. See, e.g., Tulalip Tribal Code § 2.25.070(3)(b); see also Barbara Creel, The Right to Counsel for 
Indians Accused of Crime: A Tribal and Congressional Imperative, 18 MICH. J. RACE & L. 317, 356 
n.248 (describing additional examples). 
305. See, e.g., Creel, supra note 304, at 356–58 (urging tribes to reevaluate the role of defense counsel and 
ensure that indigent defendants have counsel in adversarial proceedings); see also Kevin K. 
Washburn, Reconsidering the Commission’s Treatment of Tribal Courts, 17 FED. SENTENCING REP. 
209, 212 (2005) (arguing that the Federal Sentencing Commission should consider prior tribal 
court convictions for sentence enhancement purposes and, rather than categorically excluding 
uncounseled convictions, the Commission should allow tribes to opt out of having their convictions 
used to enhance sentences under the guidelines). 
